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Abstract
The use of illicit drugs is an area of interest across a broad range of indus-
tries and fields including public policy, law enforcement and physical and
mental health. Both the field of measuring drug use in the community and
understanding its cognitive impacts are therefore the subject of constant
research, development and innovation. This thesis examines statistical ap-
plications to temporally autocorrelated data in both the areas of drug use
extent and cognitive impact. Specifically, sampling strategies for ascertain-
ing drug use extent from waste water through the utilisation of patterns in
weekly drug use is examined. This leads to a practical example of when
representative sampling is cost effective enough to be a viable alternative to
random sampling. The ability to ascertain cognitive impacts of drug use at
the level of the individual is then explored. Analyses of empirical models
of cognitive behaviour, that have been traditionally utilised to decompose
behaviour, on psychological assessment tools the Iowa Gambling Task and
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task are considered. We show that empirical
models can lead to an inability to uniquely describe behaviour when consid-
ering individuals with possible cognitive impairments (those with extreme
behaviours) and discuss the possibility of utilising mechanistic models of the
data as a more reliable source of estimating behaviour in the extreme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis explores how data is used to make inferences about different as-
pects of illicit drug use in society. Starting with an analysis of how measuring
the extent illicit drug use can be best undertaken, and concluding with how
the impacts of illicit drug use on an individual’s cognitive processes can
be statistically ascertained, this thesis considers a range of statistical tech-
niques designed for use with temporally autocorrelated data. Throughout
the process of applying these techniques, the theme of empirically driven
analysis versus the use of mechanistic models to explain patterns in data is
explored.
1.1 Empirical Analysis and Mechanistic Models
When observing complex data there are two general situations researchers
can find themselves in. In the first situation, the researcher is observing a
complex system of data in which little is known about the structure or func-
tional mechanisms that have produced the data being observed. There may
be hypotheses about some component of the underlying processes giving rise
to the data, but these are often not enough to fully explain the variability in
the real data. In this case analysis of the data is undertaken empirically, us-
ing regular, statistical, mathematical forms of analysis that are chosen based
on the observed behaviour of the data (Thakur, 1991). Empirical analysis
may take the form of a simple comparison of means using a t-test or sim-
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ple models using linear regression; or it may be far more complex, using
statistical models such as generalised additive models and time-series tech-
niques using statistical methods such as maximum likelihood and Bayesian
analysis techniques. For example, Peacock et al. (2013) completed repeated
measures ANOVA to ascertain whether alcohol or energy drinks effect risk
taking behaviour while Ort et al. (2014a) used time series analysis to explore
changes in cocaine loads over time. Alternately, generalised additive models
have been used as alternatives to time series for identifying patterns in data
(Sullivan et al., 2015). The key aspect of all of these analyses, however, are
that they driven by the data making no or few assumptions about how the
data arose.
In the second situation, a researcher may have a well developed under-
standing of the system which created the observed data. More explicitly, the
researcher may be able to define a model, based on their understanding of
the mechanisms that produced the observed data, that can explain the main
sources of variability in what has been observed. Thakur (1991) defines such
a model as a
“. . . a secondary system used to verify any hypotheses on the
primary system.” (pp. 41)
More explicitly, we consider that the observed data has been produced from
a primary system which can explain all of the variability in the data. The
researcher will not know all of the aspects of the primary system but can
define some secondary system which explains the majority of the observed
variability. This secondary system is the model which encapsulates the re-
searchers understanding of the mechanisms producing the data. As such,
the secondary system is a mechanistic model in that it is developed inde-
pendently of the data and are based, instead, of the underlying mechanisms
which produced it.
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In the Philosophy of Science literature, the distinction between mecha-
nistic and empirical models is focused around whether you are trying to use
your model to explain your observations or predict future ones (Shmueli,
2010; Lehmann, 1990). Mechanistic models seek to explain the underlying
processes that gave rise to the observations being studied, where as empiri-
cal models don’t necessarily mind what created the observed data, just that
they can predict how future data will look. There are, of course, benefits and
limitations associated with both empirical analysis and the use of mechanis-
tic models. Using well chosen empirical analysis, for example, will ideally
find any trends and patterns within the existing data when the assumptions
of the analysis are met. Mechanistic models are, in comparison, not neces-
sarily going to represent the patterns in the data and, when this happens,
can struggle to provide useful results when used. If the goal is to make
inference about or explain the mechanisms underlying the observed data, a
well-fitting mechanistic model will be able to achieve that goal. However
empirical analyses, being driven by the data, do not necessarily have the
same ability to link to the mechanisms underlying the observed data as a
mechanistic model. The choice then of whether to use empirical analyses or
a mechanistic model appears to be driven by two main features:
1. Whether the analysis aims to make inferences about the underlying
mechanisms that created the data or the measured data itself.
2. Whether there is enough knowledge of the underlying mechanism to
create an effective mechanistic model.
So, despite the apparently clear distinction between the empirical and
mechanistic, practically the line between these two techniques is not so well
defined. When the second point has not been met, empirical analysis can be
used to inform about sources of variability not yet captured by mechanistic
14
models driving future scientific development (Shmueli, 2010). As such, we
see empirical analyses informing the creation of mechanistic models. In the
field of psychological science, Ferguson (2015) appears to agree with the
use of empirical methods to drive mechanistic models. They argue that
theories (such as those about different aspects of cognitive processing and
behaviour) can become so well established that they can be seen more like
a “truth” than the heuristics that they are. Finding this new evidence to
update these models is challenging, however, if the only means of analysing
data is through the use of a popular mechanistic model. Ferguson (2015)
suggests then, that to find new evidence, theoretical models which are less
mechanistic are required in the field of psychology.
In a direct reply to Ferguson (2015), Tryon (2016) argues against a move
toward empirical analyses and instead argues for more mechanistic models,
richer in nature, to compete with the existing models in the literature. And it
is perhaps here that we see the cross over between the practical understand-
ing between mechanistic and empirical analysis. Lehmann (1990) points
out that, even when using empirical analysis such as regression, choosing an
appropriate ARMA model or deciding on the number and form of interac-
tions in a factorial model the researcher must have first chosen the class of
models they wished to apply. Although, in some cases, this choice will be
very clear given the observed data, in others the choice may be driven by
more mechanistic considerations. So when does this process become more
mechanistic than empirical? Despite the differences in the suggestions by
Ferguson (2015) or Tryon (2016), the common theme of remaining flexible
and maintaining a search for better ways of explaining and describing ob-
served psychological phenomena remains constant, and this thesis has the
same general aim. The following chapters present both empirical and mech-
anistic analyses of a range of psychological data with the goal of improving
15
the information we can glean and the broadening the applicability of any
findings.
1.2 Temporal Autocorrelation
A common theme of all of the data considered in this thesis is temporal auto-
correlation. Data which has a temporally autocorrelated structure violates
the underlying assumption of many common statistical techniques. Regres-
sion, for example, assumes that each point is independent; which is clearly
violated in temporally autocorrelated data in which observations that are
closer together are more “alike” than those farther apart. Because of this
lack of independence, analysis techniques that take into account this serial
dependence need to be employed.
There are several ways of dealing with temporal autocorrelation which
are driven by the type of data collected and the research questions being
asked. For example, longitudinal data, collected at regular intervals, span-
ning a long range of time is often analysed using time series analysis or
generalised additive models while repeated measures data over shorter pe-
riods can be analysed using one-step ahead predictions of individual perfor-
mance. In addition to the styles of analysis chosen, the fundamental theory
of probability that a statistician adheres to can also differ. Bayesian and
frequentist techniques differ in their fundamental treatment of probabilities
and that leads to very different styles of analysis. Silva (2017) explains
that Bayesians are concerned with correctly interpreting information that
has been updated post-experiment while frequentists are focused, before the
experiment begins, on controlling the probability of coming to the wrong
conclusion. This difference, although seemingly semantic in its simplest
form, has real implications for analysis and can often lead to vastly different
conclusions being drawn from the same data. Increasingly researchers will
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analyse their data under both frameworks (a simple Google Scholar search on
the 30th of September 2017 of the term “frequentist and Bayesian” revealed
807 results for 2017 alone while a search for “frequentist” and “Bayesian”
returned 4,060 results) and the debate over which techniques are most ac-
curate is still a vibrant one.
This thesis explores a range of possible analytical techniques that cover
Bayeisan and frequentist frameworks in both mechanistic and empirical anal-
ysis styles. This is both in an attempt to showcase some of the strengths and
weaknesses of the multiple forms of analysis, and to demonstrate the breadth
of analysis techniques available for dealing with temporally autocorrelated
data.
1.2.1 Time-Series
Time-series analysis is a common way of analysing data that has been col-
lected sequentially at equally spaced time intervals over a long period of
time. Importantly, this long period of time is relative to the intervals over
which the data were collected. For example, data collected annually will re-
quire many years of observations, whereas data collected every minute may
only need a few days of data to be useful (Cowpertwait and Metcalfe, 2009).
In its simplest form, time series uses the features of the data to iter-
atively inform the model of the data, making this an empirical method of
analysis. The main features of a time series are usually an overall trend and,
potentially, some sort of seasonal variability and it is the aim of analysis to
extract and/or measure these two features. The trend and seasonality then
provide a more concise summary of the characteristics of the time series
that can be used for understanding how the measured observations have
changed in the past and, potentially, forecasting how they may continue to
change into the future (Cowpertwait and Metcalfe, 2009). It is therefore
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the features of the observed data, rather than the mechanisms creating the
observed data, that are of most interest when using time series analysis. As
such, the statistical model itself is not of great interest as the trend and
seasonality components (along with the analysis of any remainder) contain
all the information relevant to the research question.
If the research question is focused more on the mechanisms creating the
data, rather than the data itself, then time-series analysis may no longer be
an appropriate method of analysis. Any model used to fit the data ideally
would have parameters that can be linked to or interpreted in light of the
underlying mechanisms which gave rise to the data. Predicting decision-
making in the face of uncertainty, for example, may be predicted using the
outcomes of previous decisions but it may also be the case that the interest
lies in understanding the cognitive processes that led to the decisions being
made rather than the outcome itself. In this case, incorporating information
about cognitive processing into a model of the observed behaviour would be
essential to be able to estimate how the cognitive processes are behaving or
changing over time. Time series analysis does not provide such models. In
these cases, mechanistic models that are constructed using knowledge about
the processes underlying the observations are favoured.
1.2.2 One-step Ahead Prediction
Mechanistic models designed to explain or predict temporally autocorrelated
data must take into account the lack of independence between sequential
observations in the data. This can be achieved by using one-step-ahead pre-
diction where the model is developed to predict the next observation in a
time series based on the sequence of measured events up to and including
the current observation. Examples of such models are the Expectancy Va-
lence Model (presented in Chapter 4) and the two-parameter BART model
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(presented in Chapter 6).
When considering a mechanistic model, the goal is to estimate the pa-
rameter values of the given model for either a group or for an individual
data set with the aim of making inference about the underlying mechanisms
which created the data. The techniques used to find the optimal parame-
ter estimates given the data are often maximum likelihood or Bayesian in
nature and both of these styles of analyses will be explored in this thesis.
1.3 Drug use and its Impacts on Society
The final common thread weaving through the chapters of this thesis is that
of illicit drug consumption. The use of illicit drugs is an area of interest
across a broad range of industries and fields including public policy, law en-
forcement and physical and mental health. Accurately measuring the extent
of illicit drug consumption in the community, along with an understanding
of its impacts on the health and well-being of public, are fundamentally es-
sential to providing the services required to both regulate use and provide
treatment options for rehabilitation. All of the data sets considered in this
thesis are related to illicit drug consumption with the goal of analysis to bet-
ter understand either the prevalence in the community or impact of illicit
drug use on an individual’s cognition.
Both the field of measuring drug consumption in the community and
understanding its cognitive impacts are therefore the subject of constant
research, development and innovation. One such recent innovation has been
in the area of measuring illicit drug consumption extent through the sam-
pling of drug residues in sewerage (wastewater). Although the extent of il-
licit drug consumption across a population has historically been ascertained
using techniques such as surveys, crime statistics, drug seizures and con-
sumer interviews (Castiglioni et al., 2006; Banta-Green et al., 2009; Chen
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et al., 2011), limited population coverage (limited access to populations such
as those who are incarcerated or without telephones) and self-report bias
impact on the validity and reliability of this collected data (Banta-Green
et al., 2009). The Illicit Drug Reporting System and the Ecstasy and Re-
lated Drugs Reporting System are two surveys routinely used in Australia to
monitor drug use which provide critical information on illicit drug consump-
tion extent (Chen et al., 2011), but the fast moving trends associated with
illicit drug consumption are also hard to monitor in real time using survey
type methods due to the amount of time required to collect and process
information (Banta-Green et al., 2009).
Using a technique developed by Zuccato et al. (2005), analysing the
levels of illicit drug metabolites from a wastewater treatment plant at-
tempts to solve these problems. Analysis of wastewater is conducted us-
ing high-pressure liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (Cas-
tiglioni et al., 2006) which can provide relatively timely results and, as a
wastewater treatment plant is considered a closed water system in that it
serves a known population (Frost et al., 2008), those results provide a snap-
shot of an entire region rather than a specific demographic. For this reason,
once allowances have been made for the pharmacokinetics associated with a
specific drug, levels of the drug or its major metabolites can be seen as an
indicator of the level of consumption in the contributing population.
1.3.1 Waste-Water Analysis and Empirical Models
Wastewater-based epidemiology (WBE) is the process of extracting metabolic
residues from wastewater in order to make inferences about the character-
istics of the contributing population. It involves taking regular samples
(usually liquid) from a wastewater treatment plant and, after some form of
storage by freezing, they are analysed using mass-spectrometry to measure
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compounds of interest within the sample. For example, when using illicit
drugs, the drugs are metabolised and any remaining metabolised version
(metabolite) of the drug is excreted. The amount of metabolites in the
wastewater can then be measured to give an estimate of the amount of par-
ent compound that may have been consumed to create it. This emerging
technique of using waste-water analysis to measure illicit drug consump-
tion in communities was first utilised in 2005 (Zuccato et al., 2005) and has
undergone rapid acceptance as a way of gaining increasingly accurate infor-
mation all around the world (for examples see Zuccato et al. (2016); Bijlsma
et al. (2016); van Wel et al. (2016); Been et al. (2016); Lai et al. (2016b)).
This is, however, a relatively new technique with rapidly changing mark-
ers of best practice (Ort et al., 2014a; Thai et al., 2016; Humphries et al.,
2016; Ort et al., 2014b; Zuccato et al., 2016). With greater understanding
of the samples themselves is coming a greater understanding of how much
information can actually be gleaned from samples.
Due to the resource intensive nature of the collection and analysis pro-
cess, many early studies have relied on few samples taken over short periods
of time (van Nuijs et al., 2009; Prichard et al., 2012; Zuccato et al., 2011;
Khan et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015) but as the popularity of this technique
has increased, so too has the number of studies looking to take longer term,
more intensive samples (for example van Nuijs et al. (2011b); Ort et al.
(2014a); Lai et al. (2016a)). Chapter 2 explores how best to undertake
longitudinal monitoring so as to maximise the information obtained whilst
minimising the associated costs.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
1.4.1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 presents an edited version of a published paper which combines
the original article and it’s supplementary material into a coherent whole
(Humphries et al., 2016). Based on longitudinal illicit drug consumption
data, collected from a waste-water treatment plant over 13 months between
May 2011 and June 2012, the data were analysed to estimate overall trend
in illicit drug consumption as well as estimates of monthly levels of use.
Conducting longitudinal monitoring programs to investigate temporal trends
in drug consumption is challenging as it is very costly and resource intensive.
Prior to this publication, the only work in this area was a study by Ort
et al. (2014a) which investigated how a stratified random monitoring scheme
can allow reliable estimation of the average yearly usage of cocaine in a
small catchment. There remained a significant research gap to examine how
to design monitoring schemes to provide a sound assessment of temporal
changes in use for different types of drugs. Chapter 2 fills that gap.
In Chapter 2 time series analysis is used to evaluate the accuracy and
robustness of a range of potential monitoring schemes in order to select a
cost-effective scheme that still allows reliable interpretations of temporal
trends of illicit drug usage. For the first time such a study was carried out
using data (∼ 350 days) obtained in a large catchment and for four different
drugs. It was found that:
• It is important to understand the weekly cycle of drug consumption
before designing the sampling scheme.
• Utilising the weekly cycle information to inform a monitoring strat-
egy maintains the ability to reliably interpret temporal trends while
minimising the cost of data collection.
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The findings reported in Chapter 2 are important because, for the first
time, it provides researchers with a comprehensive assessment of monitoring
schemes for drugs with different usage patterns. Such information will help
researchers in the field to design long term monitoring of drug consumption
in different sewage catchments in a cost-effective way.
The comprehensive assessment of strategical monitoring schemes pre-
sented was an interdisciplinary achievement among statisticians, sewer engi-
neers and environmental scientists. The data was provided by the environ-
mental scientists Foon Lai, Phong Thai, Jake O’Brien and Jochen Mueller
who both collected the samples and completed the chemical decomposi-
tion (as presented in their article Lai et al. (2015)). All statistical analyses
were completed by me with guidance and suggestions from Barbara Holland
and Christoph Ort. I also wrote the majority of the article with guidance
from Raimondo Bruno and editing feedback from all authors. Foon Lai and
Phong Thai provided the background information for Section 2.2.1 in the
Experimental Methods.
Chapter 2 focuses on empirical analysis of time-series data. Time series
analysis is a frequentist style of analysis that provides visual estimates of
observed trends and empirical models makes sense in this case, where the
goal is to understand and make predictions about the exact thing that is
being measured. Although time series analysis is widely used for longitudinal
data, there is some evidence to suggest the use of generalised additive models
can provide results that allow stronger inference than the general trends
reported in time series. This is discussed as a direction for future work in
Chapter 2. Although there are Bayesian techniques for time series analysis
(e.g. see West et al. (1985)) they are not yet widely used and so are not
considered here.
In the field of mathematical psychology, however, Bayesian techniques
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are widely used. When looking at the impact of drug use on cognitive func-
tion, even though we may still have temporally autocorrelated data, more
information than general trends in outcomes are required and so alternatives
to time series analysis must be explored.
1.4.2 Chapter 3
Chapters 4-6 consider the impact of drug use on cognitive function through
the use of both empirical and mechanistic models to temporally autocorre-
lated data. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to cognitive models and the
utility of empirical and mechanistic styles of modelling in this space as well
as a breif discussion of the features and benefits of Bayesian and frequentist
analysis styles.
1.4.3 Chapters 4 and 5
Chapter 4 presents a published paper (Humphries et al. (2015) with supple-
mentary material in Chapter 5) and addresses whether the Expectancy Va-
lence Model (EVM), a mechanistic model of cognitive performance, is suit-
able for use at decomposing behaviour on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT),
a psychological assessment tool, at the level of the individual. The data
analysed in Chapter 4 was provided by Raimondo Bruno and collected by
Jessica Hartley and Elizabeth Murray. The analysis presented in Chapter 4
was completed by me with guidance from Simon Wotherspoon. The Chapter
itself was written in it’s entirety by me with guidance from Raimondo Bruno
and Simon Wotherspoon with editing feedback from Yuliya Karpievitch.
The EVM of the IGT is a commonly used mechanistic model aimed at
identifying the underlying psychological processes responsible for decision
making deficits and can be purchased for use in clinical practice (Bechara,
2012; Buelow and Suhr, 2009). However, high levels of uncertainty surround-
ing estimates of cognitive performance at the level of the individual have
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been reported by a growing body of literature (Wetzels et al., 2010; Stein-
groever et al., 2013a,b). Chapter 4 confirms that the EVM does not provide
clear information about decision making processes at the individual level
by fitting the EVM, with individual random effects, to a sample of partici-
pants from various drug using populations using Bayesian techniques. The
uncertainty associated with parameter estimates, gained using the EVM,
are revealed to be due to non-normal and unreasonably localised estimates
with observed estimates showing bi-modality, non-linearity or spanning the
entire parameter space. This not only makes analysis more difficult but
renders psychological interpretation of these estimates at the level of the
individual contradictory or even misleading. Using these sorts of estimates
to inform clinical practice at the level of the individual can therefore lead
to treatment recommendations that are not appropriate for the individual
being measured.
A novel second experiment, where participants are asked to complete
the IGT multiple times in an effort to increase sample size, also shows an
inability to gain precise estimates of cognitive performance for the same
non-normal and unreasonably localised reasons. But, in an attempt to in-
crease the validity of individual-level parameter estimates, a third exper-
iment proposing a new, two-parameter version of the EVM is presented.
In the two-parameter implementation of the EVM, results were clearer and
more easily interpretable than when using the traditional EVM suggesting
this may be more viable for use in a clinical setting.
1.4.4 Chapter 6
Chapter 4 highlighted that the IGT requires a complex system of cognitive
processes to produce behaviour and that the parameters of the EVM were
not able to model these cognitive processes accurately at the level of the
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individual. The solution presented in Chapter 4 was to simplify the model,
but Chapter 6 presents another solution: Using a cognitive assessment tool
which relies on a less complex system of cognitive processes to produce
behaviour.
Chapter 6 presents simulation studies of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART) which is a simple cognitive assessment tool designed to assess risk
seeking behaviour alone (Lejuez et al., 2002). Particular importance is paid
to whether the behaviour of individuals who are expected to have cognitive
deficits of some kind can be well recovered by the mechanistic and empirical
models considered. This focus links clearly with the clinical applicability of
the BART and its associated models as individuals presenting for clinical
assessment are likely to have cognitive deficits that give rise to behaviour
outside of, or more extreme than, what is considered normal.
Three models of performance on the BART are presented, the mechanis-
tically derived van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) two-parameter BART model,
and two new empirical models, The Basic Response Model (BRM) and the
Run Dependent Response Model (RDRM). Data was simulated and param-
eter recovery, using maximum likelihood, completed for each model respec-
tively to ascertain if parameter estimates of any model of behaviour on the
BART could be gained with enough accuracy to be useful at the level of the
individual.
Chapter 6 suggests that the van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) two-parameter
BART model may not always provide reliable results if used in a clinical
context where the individual being measured has some cognitive deficit.
The RDRM was able to recover parameters well in most cases and the BRM
gave the most reliable estimates of all the models considered. Given that
the BRM and RDRM are both empirical models, however, links between
the model parameters and the cognitive processes they may represent need
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to be established before their use in a clinical context. Chapter 6 therefore
suggests validity studies and application of the BRM and RDRM to real
data as future endeavours.
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Chapter 2
Evaluation of monitoring
schemes for
wastewater-based
epidemiology to identify
drug use trends using
cocaine, methamphetamine,
MDMA and methadone
This Chapter presents a version of the published article:
Humphries, M. A., Bruno, R., Lai, F. Y., Thai, P. K., Holland, B.
R., O’Brien, J. W., Ort, C., and Mueller, J. F. (2016). Evaluation of
monitoring schemes for wastewater-based epidemiology to identify drug
use trends using cocaine, methamphetamine, MDMA and methadone.
Environmental Science & Technology, 50(9):4760 - 4768.
The following chapter presents the article with supplementary material 
integrated into the body of the work, along with some extensions.
This chapter has been 
removed for copyright 
or proprietary reasons. 
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Chapter 3
Modelling Cognitive
Performance
The purpose of Chapter 2 was to look at ways of increasing the efficacy of
measuring illicit drug use using wastewater data. However, the extent of
illicit drug use in the community is not the only area in which temporally
autocorrelated drug use data can be found. The following Chapters will
consider temporally autocorrelated data aimed at measuring the effect of
illicit drug use on an individual’s cognitive performance.
3.1 Modelling Cognitive Processes
Most commonly, to measure decreases in an individual’s cognitive perfor-
mance or cognitive deficits, an individual is given some cognitive assessment
tool (in the form of a questionnaire, test or game) to complete. The resulting
answers or behaviours displayed by the individual are driven by the cognitive
processes producing that behaviour so by measuring the behaviour, indirect
measurements of the cognitive processes are obtained.
In the case of a game, an individual may be asked to complete a task
repeatedly so as to gain a large volume of data from which to estimate per-
formance. Chapters 4 and 6 consider two such games; The Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT; Chapter 4) and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Chap-
ter 6). In the IGT, individuals are asked to repeatedly choose from decks
of cards to win money and their choices are directly related to how much
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money they win. The BART has a similar goal of winning as much money
as possible, but to do so, the individual is asked to repeatedly pump up
balloons as large as possible without bursting them (larger balloons make
more money).
The IGT and the BART both use a gambling-style, money maximising
scenario, and so are commonly used for ascertaining whether individuals are
highly impulsive. High levels of impulsivity are theorised to be related to
continual use of some illicit drugs (Belin et al., 2008; Baldacchino et al.,
2015; Ansell et al., 2015) making these assessment tools particularly rel-
evant for measuring the effects of drug use at the level of the individual.
Research into the relationship between illicit drug use and impulsivity, as
both a predictor and a consequence of continued illicit drug use, is ongoing
(Moeller et al., 2001; Dawe and Loxton, 2004; de Wit, 2009; Nuijten et al.,
2016; Kluwe-Schiavon et al., 2016). But evidence has shown that highly im-
pulsive individuals are more likely to relapse, when trying to abstain from
illicit drug use, than their less-impulsive counterparts (Moeller et al., 2001;
Economidou et al., 2009; Nuijten et al., 2016). In a clinical setting under-
standing whether a client is highly impulsive and therefore less likely to
present for treatment (Moeller et al., 2001) or whether they are more likely
to discount risk over reward (Dawe and Loxton, 2004) can have implications
for type of treatment suggested. Incorporating techniques for dealing with
high risk situations and encouraging attendance at treatment will therefore
be an integral part of maximising recovery for highly impulsive individuals.
Identifying impulsivity at the level of the individual, with a good level of
accuracy, is therefore the focus of Chapters 4 and 6.
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3.2 Empirical and Mechanistic Models of Cogni-
tive Performance
Whether considering the IGT or the BART, participants are asked to com-
plete many sequential trials on the game. Completing many trials allows for
averaging of performance across a greater number of trials, getting closer to
what might be seen as true performance estimates. However, when complet-
ing multiple trials on the same task, there is clearly sequential information
being processed by the individual leading to a lack of independence between
trials. For both games then, the temporal autocorrelation in the data from
each individual is a factor that must be considered in analysis. However,
unlike in Chapter 2, time series analysis may not be the best way to model
this sort of data.
As described in Chapter 1, time series analyses breaks down autocor-
related data into an overall trend and, potentially, some sort of seasonal
variability. Given that the aim of any analysis of the IGT and BART data
is to gain some measure of cognitive performance, with a focus on when
performance on the task changes rapidly in response to negative or positive
outcomes, trends and seasonal effects produced by time series analysis does
not match well with answering this aim. Empirical analysis then usually
focuses on summaries of the data such as average amounts of money won,
average number of times completing options are taken (for example Kim
et al. (2016); Dai et al. (2015)) or, in the case of the BART, average number
of time balloons are pumped up (for example Kessler et al. (2016); Balaguero
et al. (2016)). These sorts of analysis are capable of providing summaries
of performance but, just like times series, they do not directly model the
underlying cognitive processes that gave rise to the observed behaviour.
To make inferences about the cognitive processes that give rise to the
measured behaviour, mechanistic models driven by the theories about how
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the underlying cognitive processes work are used. Chapters 4 and 6 consider
two popular mechanistic models which are implemented in the IGT and the
BART respectively. Chapter 4 (and the associated supplementary material
in Chapter 5), presents a published article in which a mechanistic model
is suggested as an alternative to a commonly used mechanistic model for
decomposing behaviour on the IGT (Humphries et al., 2015). The analysis
explored covers some empirical summaries but uses Bayesian analysis tech-
niques to ascertain the ability to gain insight into cognitive deficits at the
level of the individual.
Extending on this, Chapter 6 also looks at cognitive deficits at the level of
an individual, but presents a simulation study comparing empirical model
and mechanistic models used to describe performance on the BART. In
Chapter 6, we contrast a leading mechanistic model with a purely empirical
model using frequentist model comparison techniques. We also propose a
mechanistic extension of the empirical model, based on our understanding
of behaviour rather than driven by the data, which illustrates one of the
possible intersections between these two styles of analyses.
3.3 Frequesntist and Bayesian Analysis
The differences between Chapters 4 and 6 do not stop at the level of em-
pirical versus mechanistic modelling. They also deal with two very distinct
ways of analysing data covering the application of Bayesian and frequentist
techniques. In the field of mathematical psychology, Bayesian styles of anal-
ysis in cognitive modelling is extremely common due to both the complexity
of the models and the cognitive processes they represent.
3.3.1 Maximum Likelihood
Both frequentist and Bayesian analyses use maximum likelihood techniques,
in some form, to reach their conclusions but it is in how maximum likelihood
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is used specifically that these two theories differ. Maximum likelihood is a
classical, frequentist, statistical estimation technique in which inference is
based on the likelihood of the data alone (Congdon, 2003). Specifically,
Maximum likelihood estimation provides the most likely point estimate for
a parameter of interest given the observed data (Pawitan, 2001).
Let Y1, ..., Yn be independent samples drawn at random for a distribution
with probability density function f(y|θ). Here the y is a vector of observed
data and θ is the vector of parameters in the distribution function of y. If
we then view f as a function of θ that is conditional on the observations y,
we obtain the likelihood function
L(θ|y) =
n∏
i=1
f(yi|θ). (3.1)
Maximum likelihood estimation is the process of determining the value of θ
that maximises the likelihood function.
The Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) is the θˆ that maximises the
log likelihood is obtained by solving when the score function
S(θ) ≡ ∂
∂θ
logL(θ) = 0.
To ascertain the variance associated with the MLE, the observed Fisher
information
I(θ) ≡ − ∂
2
∂θ2
logL(θ)
must be considered. Large curvature in I(θˆ) is associated with a tight peak,
indicating more knowledge about θ. The law of large numbers implies that as
n→∞, the maximum likelihood estimates will be approximately normally
distributed with a standard error determined by the inverse of the Fisher
Information. This can be seen by expanding logL in a Taylor Series about
the MLE
logL(θ) ≈ logL(θˆ)− 1
2
(θ − θˆ)(T )I(θˆ)(θ − θˆ). (3.2)
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The first order term of the expansion is zero at a maximum and, for large
samples, neglecting the larger order terms is justified by the law of large
numbers so that approximately
θ ∼ N(θˆ, I− 12 (θˆ)).
So parameter estimates are considered to be approximately normally dis-
tributed and the Fisher information gives the inverse covariance of parame-
ter estimates. This argument relies both on a quadratic approximation and
large samples, but the validity of the Taylor Series approximation also needs
to be good in the vicinity of the mode (i.e. a single mode). This means that
if the MLE is near the boundary of parameter space, or if there are multi-
ple modes, the arguments fall apart. Simple point estimates and confidence
intervals in these cases are not meaningful when obtained in this way.
For any finite sample, there is no guarantee that normality assumptions
are accurate for non-linear problems, such as with many cognitive models.
Further to this, estimates using the MLE can be inaccurate for parameters
with bounded domains (Pawitan, 2001), as the Taylor Series argument in
Equation 3.2 is called into question and, in mechanistic, cognitive models it
usual to see parameters with bounded. So it would appear that, for mecha-
nistic cognitive models, maximum likelihood estimation can run into a raft
of problems that can call it’s results into question. Bayesian estimation tech-
niques do not carry these assumptions and can quite easily overcome prob-
lems associated with non-linear modelling and bounded parameter domains
which is why it is so widely used in the field of mathematical psychology.
3.3.2 Bayesian Analysis
Unlike maximum likelihood techniques, which rely on the long run frequency
of events to define probability, the Bayesian framework is based on degrees of
belief. This means that, instead of estimating fixed model parameters once
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the data has been observed, Bayesian estimation allows us to consider our
parameters as random variables and build up our knowledge about how they
are distributed as we see evidence. In Bayesian estimation we are estimating
the posterior density P (θ|y) of our parameters θ
P (θ|y) = P (y|θ)P (θ)∫
θ P (y|θ)P (θ)
(3.3)
where P (y|θ) is the likelihood of our observations y given θ and P (θ) is
our prior distribution. The prior distribution is a unique feature of Bayesian
analysis and encapsulates our knowledge about how our parameters are dis-
tributed. This is usually chosen to be uninformative and it is updated once
the evidence has been observed to approach the true distribution of θ. In
this way, Bayesian techniques avoid the problems with Newton minimisation
described above by providing the opportunity for deriving the true distribu-
tion of parameters without forcing them to adopt a normal distribution.
The flexibility of Bayesian analysis to allow model parameters to define
their own distributions is particularly important with mechanistic models
that have complex relationships between parameters. This is the main ap-
peal of these methods in the field of mathematical psychology. However,
these techniques have not been quite so emphatically adopted in other ar-
eas where models tend to meet the assumptions of traditional, frequentist
forms of analysis. This is particularly true of empirical, data driven models
which often have less complex relationships between parameters. This thesis
looks at an example of when Bayesian analysis is particularly necessary in
the analysis of the Expectancy Valence Model of the Iowa Gambling Task
in Chapter 4. In this chapter we present a published paper showing how
a complex, mechanistic model of cognitive performance fails the assump-
tions required for maximum likelihood estimation through a full hierarchical
Bayesian analysis of the model.
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In Chapter 6 another mechanistic model of cognitive performance, which
measures outcomes on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, is presented. Again,
it is shown that the assumptions for maximum likelihood estimation are not
met, but this time the conclusion is reached through a simple frequentist
analysis of the model. In addition, two simple empirical models of per-
formance are suggested and are analysed using frequentist methods with
success. This perhaps highlights the reasoning behind the lack of rigor-
ous uptake of Bayesian methods across fields who rely heavily on empirical
techniques.
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Chapter 4
The Expectancy Valence
Model of the Iowa Gambling
Task: Can it produce reliable
estimates for individuals?
This Chapter presents an edited version of the published article:
Humphries, M. A., Bruno, R., Karpievitch, Y., and Wotherspoon, S.
(2015). The expectancy valence model of the Iowa gambling task: Can
it produce reliable estimates for individuals? Journal of Mathematical
Psychology, 64 - 65:17 - 34.
4.1 Introduction
Impulsivity is a multidimensional construct; it can, for example, relate to a
failure to follow instructions or wait for one’s turn (execution impulsivity);
responding before all the essential information has been gathered (prepara-
tion impulsivity), or failing to delay gratification; focussing on short term
or positive outcomes and relatively discounting long term or negative out-
comes (outcome impulsivity) (see Evenden (1999b) for a review). Developed
by Bechara et al. (1994), the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a four-armed
bandit task designed to measure deficits in decision making among clinical
populations, in particular the notion of outcome impulsivity. To complete
the IGT, a participant chooses from four computerised decks of cards to try
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and maximise their long-term return. Successful completion of the task re-
quires the participant to learn that two of the decks are disadvantageous over
time (high immediate returns but long term losses) while the remaining two
decks are advantageous (low immediate win amounts but long term gains).
Highly impulsive individuals will, theoretically, show poor performance on
the IGT due to the appeal of the high immediate win amounts associated
with the disadvantageous decks (Bechara et al., 1994).
The IGT is currently being sold as a clinical assessment tool for the
assessment of individual decision making deficits (Bechara, 2012; Buelow
and Suhr, 2009). With multiple, independent studies showing an association
between IGT scores and substance use relapse (Nejtek et al., 2013; De Wilde
et al., 2013b; Radat et al., 2013; De Wilde et al., 2013a; Wang et al., 2013;
Goudriaan et al., 2011; Kasar et al., 2010; Salgado et al., 2009; Passetti
et al., 2008), the IGT is a popular choice when developing treatment plans
in a clinical setting. Two of the simplest, standard ways of identifying
poor performance on the IGT are to examine the overall net return after
a specified number of trials, or to look at the frequency of choices from
advantageous and disadvantageous decks in blocks across the duration of
the task (Poletti et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Lamers et al., 2006; Stout
et al., 2004). However, some studies have demonstrated that these standard
measures have questionable validity (Lin et al., 2013; Steingroever et al.,
2013a; Buelow and Suhr, 2009). More pertinently, both net return and
frequency of deck choice measure composites of multiple decision making
processes, making it hard to argue that poor performance indicated by these
measures is due to impulsive behaviour alone. For example, a participant
has to remember multiple outcomes over time in order to make the most
advantageous choices in the future, so it is reasonable to think that deficits
in learning processes will also lead to poor performance on the IGT due to
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that fact.
To disentangle the differences between poor performance on the IGT due
to high outcome impulsivity or due to poor learning, a more sophisticated
mode of analysis is required. Cognitive models of performance allow the un-
derlying psychological processes driving observed performance to be teased
apart and measured. In this way behaviours that are composites of different
psychological processes can be understood in greater depth. Although sev-
eral cognitive models have been proposed to disentangle the psychological
processes underlying performance on the IGT (for examples see Steingroever
et al. (2013b) and Ahn et al. (2008)), the Expectancy Valence Model (EVM)
proposed by Busemeyer and Stout (2002), has been the most widely imple-
mented. Producing estimates of impulsivity or motivational processes, mem-
ory and learning, and response consistency (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002),
the EVM has been successfully used to identify high impulsivity levels in
cocaine users (Stout et al., 2004), memory deficits in Huntington’s sufferers
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002) and differences in a raft of other psychologi-
cal groups of interest when compared to control groups (for a review of the
applications of the EVM on the IGT see Yechiam et al. (2005)).
Given the success of the EVM at decomposing performance on the IGT
for groups, and given that the IGT is widely used in clinical settings, there
would be great potential benefits in applying the EVM of the IGT at the
level of the individual. For example, individuals with drug addictions are
known to be more likely to relapse following rehabilitation if they are highly
impulsive (Nejtek et al., 2013; De Wilde et al., 2013b; Radat et al., 2013;
Passetti et al., 2008). Using the IGT as an assessment tool, and then decom-
posing behaviour for the individual using the EVM, a clinician would get a
clearer estimate of impulsivity for the individual than using the standard,
composite measures of performance on the IGT such as net return. If a client
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was identified as being highly impulsive, then any treatment plan could in-
clude extra coping strategies for high risk situations to try and avoid relapse.
However, this depends on gaining a clear and valid estimate of impulsivity
for the individual.
An increasing body of literature shows that estimates using the EVM to
identify deficits in the psychological processes required to complete the IGT
at the level of the individual produce highly uncertain estimates. Wetzels
et al. (2010) highlight this problem by showing that EVM parameter esti-
mates are highly uncertain at the level of the individual, even for simulated
data in which the parameter values are known. Without precise estimates,
it would be inappropriate to use the EVM to decompose behaviour on the
IGT at the level of the individual and there are warnings in the literature
against this course of action (Wetzels et al., 2010).
If it were possible to reduce the uncertainty associated with EVM es-
timates of impulsivity and memory when the IGT is used as an individ-
ual assessment tool, the EVM could be used to identify potential cognitive
deficits leading to poor performance at an individual level. These results
would provide more clinically useful information than the composite mea-
sures currently in use and would assist in tailoring treatments specific to the
needs of the particular person. However, to be able to reduce uncertainty,
the reason for the existence of the uncertainty must be determined. In this
paper, we aim to explore why the EVM produces such highly uncertain
individual-level parameter estimates, and examine an option for reducing
uncertainty.
4.1.1 The Iowa Gambling Task
Proposed as a simulation of real-life decision making in the face of uncer-
tainty, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) requires participants to make a series
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of choices from four virtual decks of cards with the aim of maximising the
amount won. The four presented decks have fixed (but undisclosed) win-to-
loss ratios and dollar amounts, with two decks culminating in overall wins
and two in overall losses (Table 4.1). Participants with unimpaired decision
making processes converge to choices from profitable decks only (Busemeyer
and Stout, 2002). A full description of the task is available in Wetzels et al.
(2010).
Table 4.1: Payoff scheme of the traditional IGT (Bechara et al., 1994). Decks
A & B may yield higher reward amounts but their associated loss amounts
are also larger, resulting in net losses if chosen regularly. Decks C and D
are, therefore, considered the advantageous decks.
Bad Decks Good Decks
A B C D
Reward/Trial 100 100 50 50
Number of Losses/10 cards 5 1 5 1
Loss/10 cards -1250 -1250 -250 -250
Net outcome/10 cards -250 -250 250 250
Successful completion of the IGT requires the participant to explore all
of the decks and, once all of the decks have been thoroughly explored, exploit
the most profitable decks. To achieve this goal, a participant must evalu-
ate the outcome of every deck choice, use this information to update any
expectancies about returns associated with the decks and then make subse-
quent decision based on what has been previously learned. It is proposed
that distinct brain regions or systems are responsible for producing each of
these three processes and, as such, performance levels in each one of these
processes can be depleted or vary independently of performance the others
(Stocco et al., 2009). Poor performance on the IGT may be interpreted as
a possible deficit in the relevant process.
73
4.2 Theory
4.2.1 The Expectancy Valence Model
The EVM is a cognitive model designed to interpret performance on the
IGT by identifying the underlying psychological processes responsible for
deficits in decision making. This utilises a series of four nested equations that
attempt to model a respondent’s motivational processes, memory/learning
and consistency of choice (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). Several assumptions
are used by the EVM. First, the perceived value of a return may be different
from the actual net value (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). A Valence, in
the form of a weighted, unidimensional utility function, incorporates this
assumption into the model when a deck has been chosen. The Valence v is
defined as
vi,t = W × wint + (1−W )× losst (4.1)
for the chosen deck i on trial t, where 0 < W < 1 is the weighting parameter,
wint is the amount won on trial t and losst is the amount lost on trial t. The
weighting parameter W therefore represents shifts in attention between wins
and losses, theoretically differentiating between highly impulsive individuals,
who focus heavily on wins, and more conservative individuals that have a
greater focus on the implication of losses (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002).
Second, any expectations about the outcomes associated with choosing
a deck are learned by experience (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). Once the
Valence has been formed, it is incorporated into the body of knowledge an
individual is building about a deck forming the Expectancy
Ei,t = (1− φ)× Ei,t−1 + φ× vi,t (4.2)
for deck i on trial t, where 0 < φ < 1 is the weighting parameter which
determines the updating rate of the Expectancy. It is important to highlight
here that the Expectancy of deck i is only updated when deck i is chosen.
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The Expectancy for the remaining three decks will remain exactly the same
until they are chosen again at some point in the future.
Consider a sequence of trials T for a given deck i. Then Tn denotes the
nth time, irrespective of trial number, that deck i was chosen. For example,
when deck i is chosen for the third time, n = 3 such that T3 indicates the
third time deck i was chosen. Equation 4.2 can therefore be written as
Ei,Tn = φ× vi,Tn + φ(1− φ)× vi,Tn−1 + φ(1− φ)2 × vi,Tn−2 + . . .
. . .+ φ(1− φ)Tn−1 × vi,T1 + (1− φ)Tn × Ei,0.
Here it is easier to see that for values of φ close to zero, the updated Ex-
pectancy will be dominated by the initial Expectancy Ei,0 = 0, which is a
state of no knowledge.
The series representation of the Expectancy can be summed to yield an
explicit expression for the Expectancy
Ei,Tn+1 = (1− φ)Tn+1
(
Ei,0 +
n∑
k=0
φ× vi,Tk
(1− φ)Tk+1
)
(4.3)
for deck i on trial Tn+1, given that participants begin the task with a state
of no knowledge about the payoff structure of the decks. This expression is
used in computation of the likelihood for the EVM, and a full derivation is
provided in the supplementary material.
Third, the learned expectancies related to a deck will determine the prob-
ability of choosing any given deck (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). The EVM
represents this assumption by using a ratio-of-strengths rule to compare the
probabilities of choosing each deck
Pr [Di,t+1] =
eEi,t×θ(t)∑4
j=1 e
Ej,t×θ(t) (4.4)
where Ei,t is the Expectancy for deck Di on trial t as described in Equation
4.2. Alone, a ratio of strengths rule would ensure that if any deck has a much
larger Expectancy than the remaining decks, then a choice from this deck will
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be highly favoured (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). However as participants
become fatigued or bored as the task progresses, their choices may become
less consistent than the ratio of strengths rule alone would explain. To allow
for this, a trial dependant sensitivity function θ(t) is included in Equation
4.4, where
θ(t) =
(
t
10
)c
(4.5)
for trial t with −5 < c < 5. Busemeyer and Stout (2002) argue that within
Equation 4.5, negative values of c will represent boredom with the task or
fatigue by decreasing the sensitivity to Equation 4.2 and increasing the num-
ber of random choices. As such, c is presented as representing consistency
of choice. It should also be highlighted that c is included as a power of
the sensitivity function and as such, very small changes in c result in large
changes in the overall probability of choice.
Full descriptions of the model and its development are available elsewhere
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002; Wetzels et al., 2010).
4.3 Experiment 1
Despite being demonstrated in multiple studies to provide some prediction
of risk of relapse, the standard measures of performance on the IGT (net
return or frequency of deck selection) provide only composite measures of
behaviour (Nejtek et al., 2013; De Wilde et al., 2013b; Radat et al., 2013;
Goudriaan et al., 2011). Using the IGT as a clinical tool, with these compos-
ite measures of performance, provides an illustrative case where the evidence
obtained may not be detailed enough to accurately inform decisions relat-
ing to treatment options (such as whether to continue current treatment, or
to classify a person as having a high risk of relapse). In previous studies,
the EVM has been used to disentangle these composite measures and com-
pare the underlying psychological processes responsible for decision making
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deficits on the IGT across groups of psychological interest (Peatfield et al.,
2012; Brown et al., 2012; He et al., 2012; Yechiam et al., 2007; Bechara
et al., 2000; Yechiam et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam et al.,
2005). Despite large amounts of uncertainty associated with individual level
parameter estimates, the EVM of the IGT has been successful in differen-
tiating groups of participants such as neurologically impaired from healthy
individuals. By pooling information across multiple individuals, the uncer-
tainty of group parameter estimates is reduced; however, if the EVM was
to be used at the level of the individual instead, the uncertainty associated
with EVM parameter estimates would have to be reduced at the level of the
individual (Wetzels et al., 2010). With the aim of ascertaining why the ob-
served parameter distributions are so highly variable, we consider a random
effects model in which the random effect represents subject-to-subject vari-
ability. In addition, participants completed a 250 trial version of the task,
rather than a 100 trial version as is often displayed in the literature. This is
in line with the recent finding that 100 trials is insufficient for participants
to learn the nature of the decks (Steingroever et al., 2013a).
The data provided for these analyses were collected from four drug use
groups: MDMA (3.4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine) only consumers,
cannabis only consumers, MDMA-and-cannabis polydrug consumers and
drug-na¨ıve controls. It has previously been shown that regular drug use is
associated with increased levels of impulsivity (Quednow et al., 2007; Stout
et al., 2005; Parrott et al., 2007; Yechiam et al., 2005) which, in the case of
the IGT, may produce a strong focus on rewards and result in high attention
to wins on the Valence parameter for the EVM. Higher outcome impulsivity
is, therefore, expected in each of the drug using groups, manifesting in an
increased positive affective reaction towards wins. It would be expected,
therefore, that the values of W in the EVM will thus be increased.
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The serotonergic impairment specifically associated with ecstasy use has
also been shown to be related to learning and memory deficits and height-
ened impulsivity independent of the effects of use of other substances (Laws
and Kokkalis, 2007; Evenden, 1999a). The MDMA use group would, there-
fore, be expected to display more volatile behaviour, and hence have higher
values of φ than non-MDMA using groups since φ can be interpreted as
an indicator of deficits on memory. Increases in φ are representative of a
reduction in the ability to retain information over time (Lane et al., 2006;
Stout et al., 2005).
4.3.1 Method
Participants
The data used for analyses were provided by the School of Psychology at
the University of Tasmania. Information was provided for 25 participants
from four different groups as follows:
1. Drug na¨ıve controls (11 individuals with no history of drug use in the
preceding six months and maximum lifetime history of five occasions
of illicit drug use);
2. Regular users of MDMA (3 individuals with no history of cannabis
use);
3. Regular Cannabis users (4 individuals with no history of ecstasy use);
4. Regular users of both MDMA and Cannabis (7 individuals).
No participant was in more than one group.
Materials
Each individual participated in a 250 trial version of the Iowa Gambling
Task as created and described by Grasman and Wagenmakers (2005). The
order in which the decks were presented were randomised for each task
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and the order of wins and losses were randomised within ten trial blocks
(Grasman and Wagenmakers, 2005). The current implementation made no
changes to the defaults set in the program other than to define the number
of trials as 250. That is, gain and loss amounts were not changed, the visual
feedback function (which presents a happy or sad face when the individual
makes a profitable or non-profitable choice respectively) was turned off, but
graphical feedback was turned on. Graphical feedback consisted of informing
the participant of how much they have won and how much they have lost on
the current trial, the net amount they had before their most recent choice,
their net total after their most recent choice, and the current trial number
and the total number of trials.
4.3.2 Random Effects Models and Bayesian Estimation
In it’s simplest form, Bayesian estimation makes use of Bayes formula:
P (H|E) = P (E|H)P (H)
P (E)
where H is the hypothesis we are testing and E is the evidence collected.
In this way we integrate our prior beliefs about the probability of the hy-
pothesis, P (H) with the likelihood of observing the collected data if the
hypothesis were true, P (E|H). After rescaling for the probability of observ-
ing the evidence independent of any hypothesis, P (E), we gain an updated
belief about the posterior probability of the hypothesis being true given the
observed data, P (H|E). In the current case, the “hypothesis” relates to
the parameter estimates of the models under consideration and the priors
will be defined by our beliefs surrounding their distribution. To begin with,
however, the form of the likelihood must be defined.
For person k from group j on trial t, the standard EVM model is
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ykjt ∼ Multinomial(1, {pkj1, pkj2, . . . , pkjt−1})
pkjt = EV(t,Wkj , φkj , ckj , {ykj1, ykj2, . . . , ykjt−1})
where each individual has their own responses ykt and probabilities pkt. To
incorporate random effects into the model, allowing for individual variability
within estimates, for group j each of the EVM parameters Wkj , φkj and ckj
were constrained to be normally distributed
Wkj ∼ N(µWj , σ2Wj)
φkj ∼ N(µφj , σ2φj)
ckj ∼ N(µcj , σ2cj)
for independent Wkj , φkj and ckj . This produced the classical likelihood for
the full random effects model for each group
L(y|µW , σ2W , µφ, σ2φ, µc, σ2c )
=
∏
kj
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
P (ykj |Wkj , φkj , ckj)
× P (Wkj |µW , σ2W )P (φkj |µφ, σ2φ)P (ckj |µc, σ2c )dWdφdc (4.6)
where the three integrals represent multidimensional integrals over allWkj , φkj
and ckj and with the probabilities P of the observed variables conditional
on the random variables.
Equation 4.6 is analytically intractable and marginalizing over the ran-
dom effects would require numerical quadrature (Pawitan, 2001). Due to
the high degree of accuracy required and the computational intensity asso-
ciated with numerical quadrature, this approach may not provide accurate
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estimates. However, Bayesian estimation techniques avoid the problems
associated with using Newton minimization in association with numerical
quadrature (Congdon, 2003). In addition, for large data sets it is com-
mon to assume that parameter estimates are normally distributed and to
estimate their covariances from the Fisher information (Pawitan, 2001). If
these assumptions are not met, and for a finite sample there is no guarantee
that they are, accurate point estimates and informative standard errors may
be hard to obtain (discussed further in the supplementary material). The
advantage of Bayesian estimation techniques are that they provide a mecha-
nism for deriving the distribution of the parameters, rather than forcing the
adoption of a normal approximation. It has been consistently shown that
Bayesian estimation techniques result in more reliable estimates than maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (Ahn et al., 2011; Wetzels et al., 2010). For these
reasons, this study uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to
derive Bayesian estimates of parameters in the EVM.
4.3.3 Markov Chain Monte Carlo Sampling
The benefit of using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods is that
the complex search for maximum likelihood solutions to multi-parameter
problems can be avoided by sampling directly from the posterior density
(Congdon, 2003). Analysis was completed using a probit transformation.
The probit transformation negates the need for truncated normal priors on
bounded parameters as it transforms a (0,1) constraint on a parameter to
(-∞, ∞). Once analysis was completed, results were back-transformed into
their original parameter domains.
The full posterior is proportional to
P (µW , µφ, µc, τW , τφ, τc|ykt) ∝ P (y|µW , µφ, µc, τW , τφ, τc)
× P (µW )P (µφ)P (µc)P (τW )P (τφ)P (τc). (4.7)
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where we have parametrized in terms of the precisions τW = σ
−2
W , τφ = σ
−2
φ
and τc = σ
−2
c . The first term on the right hand side of Equation 4.7 is the
likelihood described in Equation 4.6 and the remaining terms represent the
prior distributions. Independent, diffuse priors were assumed for the model
parameters.
The Metropolis sampler (Gilks et al., 1995) with a multivariate normal
proposal distribution was used to sample Wkj , φkj , ckj for each individual
in each group, conditional on the µW , µφ, µc, τw, τφ, τc. A Gibbs sampler
was used to sample for the population parameters µw, µφ, µc, τw, τφ, τc con-
ditional on the individual random effects Wkj , φkj , ckj .
In total, 25,000 MCMC samples were drawn from the posterior distri-
bution of each parameter for each individual. The MCMC samples were
thinned by retaining only every tenth sample to reduce autocorrelation, and
the first 500 retained samples were discarded to reduce dependence on the
starting values. Analysis was completed using the statistical program R
(The R Development Core Team, 2009), and the code for all computations
is available by contacting the author directly.
Exploratory analysis of posterior distributions of the parameters in the
EVM revealed cases for which the posterior was bi-modal. When a distribu-
tion does not have connected support, it can become hard for a single chain
to sample the entire posterior and it can become trapped near one mode
(Gilks et al., 1995). If this happens, convergence statistics can be good, but
only because the chain is not aware of (or has not sampled) the remain-
ing mode or modes. Using a multiple chain MCMC sampling method can,
therefore, provide a more even and representative sample from the target
distribution than using a single chain alone (Chib and Greenberg, 1995).
We thus used multiple chain MCMC techniques running five chains from
random starting values for each individual.
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Raftery-Lewis diagnostics were completed to ascertain the effective sam-
ple size (ESS) required to achieve convergence of the chains and to ascertain
if the chains were too highly autocorrelated or if they were ‘sticking’ in
modes (Raftery and Lewis, 1992). Convergence of the chains was tested
using Gelman and Rubin’s multivariate convergence diagnostic, the mul-
tivariate potential scale reduction factor (MPSRF) (Brooks and Gelman,
1998).
To test the accuracy of our implementation of the model, IGT data
was simulated for 95 synthetic participants across a full range of values for
the parameters of the EVM. The EVM was then fit to the generated data
using the formulas described above to see if the parameter values could be
recovered. Posterior predictive checks were also completed by drawing 1,000
posterior samples per participant, simulating a new data set for each sample
and then comparing the net return of the simulated data with the net return
of the observed data. If the observed net return was within a 95% for the
mean of the simulated net returns, this was deemed a successful fit.
4.3.4 Results
For a psychological assessment tool to be useful, it needs to be universally
effective across the populations it is designed for. The following results have
been chosen as examples of why the described analyses of performance on the
IGT are not universally effective. If enough examples can be found showing
a tool does not work, or that the interpretation of performance on the tool
is inaccurate, then the applicability of the tool and/or the measurement of
performance on the task must be brought into question. In the current study,
use of the EVM to analyse performance on the IGT produced ineffective
and potentially inaccurate results more often than it produced reasonable
results. The individual results presented are good examples of the described
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phenomena but they are also representative of the entire sample. The deck
selection profiles and posterior distributions of the parameter estimates for
the EVM for all participants are presented in the supplementary material.
Frequency of Deck Choices and Net Return
Several studies have compared relative frequencies of deck choices as a mea-
sure of performance on the IGT, suggesting that similar frequency of deck
choices reflects similar decision making behaviour, implying similar degrees
of underlying neurological functioning (Poletti et al., 2011; Brown et al.,
2012; Lamers et al., 2006; Stout et al., 2004; Ahn et al., 2008; Yechiam and
Ert, 2007). Figure 4.1 shows the overall frequencies of deck choice across
the four groups (Group 1 - Drug na¨ıve, Group 2 - MDMA only, Group
3 - Cannabis only, Group 4 - MDMA and Cannabis). With the possible
exception of the ecstasy group, there is little difference in the overall fre-
quency of deck selection across the four groups, suggesting that differences
in behaviour are not represented by the overall frequency of deck selection,
but in the sequence with which decks are selected. Consider Figures 4.2
and 4.3 which show two regular users of both cannabis and ecstasy with a
similar frequency of deck choices. Despite the similarity in in frequency of
deck choice, the net return experienced is quite different, with net return
displayed in Figure 4.2 $2550 less than that displayed in Figure 4.3.
Due to the randomness with which win and loss amounts are ordered
when completing the task, although participants may have similar frequency
of deck choice, the returns they experience on any of those choices will vary
and, as such, each participant will have a unique experience of the deck
returns. It is the way the individual responds to this unique experience
that defines an individual’s overall performance, not the number of times
the individual chooses a deck. This supports previous findings that suggest
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Figure 4.1: Frequency of deck selections for each deck by participant group.
In this figure, group 1 is the drug na¨ıve group, group 2 are regular users
of ecstasy, group 3 are regular users of cannabis and group 4 are regular
users of both ecstasy and cannabis. Each dot represents the frequency of
deck choice for an individual participant. A large amount of variability in
frequency of deck choices within each group is visible with little discernible
differences apparent between groups.
Figure 4.2: Deck selection profile of IGT performance for a regular users
of both cannabis and ecstasy. A circle represents a choice from the corre-
sponding deck label on the left of the figure and if the circle is filled, then
a loss was experienced. The net return experienced for this participant was
an overall loss of $650 with Decks A chosen approximately 16%, B 34%, C
16% and D 33% of the time. Comparing this profile to the profile displayed
in Figure 4.3 shows that despite having similar frequency of deck choices,
the net return acquired by the participant in Figure 4.3 (an overall win of
$1900) is extremely different to this participant.
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Figure 4.3: Deck selection profile of IGT performance for a regular users
of both cannabis and ecstasy. A circle represents a choice from the corre-
sponding deck label on the left of the figure and if the circle is filled, then
a loss was experienced. The net return experienced for this participant was
an overall win of $1900 with Decks A chosen approximately 10%, B 30%, C
20% and D 40% of the time. Comparing this profile to the profile displayed
in Figure 4.2 shows that despite having similar frequency of deck choices,
the net return acquired by the participant in Figure 4.2 (an overall loss of
$650) is extremely different to this participant.
collapsing choices across the task into good and bad deck categories does
not capture performance well (Steingroever et al., 2013a).
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show two participants with similar net return ($2950
and $3050 respectively) but choice strategies which are quite different. Al-
though Figure 4.5 shows a net return of only $100 more than that shown
in 4.4, unlike in Figure 4.4 this participant clearly did not converge to a
preferred deck and was still making somewhat erratic choices throughout
the duration of the task. Again, this would support the idea that net return
is not capturing the complexity of the decision making process required to
complete the IGT. Using frequency of deck choice or net return to analyse
performance on the IGT is, therefore, not recommended and will not be
pursued further in this chapter.
Parameter Recovery and Posterior Predictive Checks
From the 95 synthetic participants (with known values of W , φ and c) the
credible intervals of the posteriors contained the imputed parameter value
of W ' 97% and φ ' 94% of the time. This suggests that the Bayesian esti-
mation of the EVM described here is able to recover the imputed parameter
values of W and φ with reasonable accuracy. As previously described, very
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Figure 4.4: Deck selection profiles of IGT performance for a healthy drug
na¨ıve participant displaying convergence of deck choices to favoured decks. A
circle represents a choice from the corresponding deck label on the left of the
figure and if the circle is filled, then a loss was experienced. The net return
experienced for this participant was an overall win of $2950 with Decks A
chosen approximately 12%, B 9%, C 57% and D 22% of the time. Despite
the similarities in net return between this participant and the participant
displayed in Figure 4.5 (with an overall win of $3050), the strategies of deck
choice are not similar as in Figure 4.5 the participant continues to make less
consistent choices throughout the task.
Figure 4.5: Deck selection profiles of IGT performance for a regular user
of cannabis displaying inconsistent choices throughout the task. A circle
represents a choice from the corresponding deck label on the left of the
figure and if the circle is filled, then a loss was experienced. The net return
experienced for this participant was an overall win of $3050 with Decks A
chosen approximately 16%, B 13%, C 39% and D 32% of the time. Despite
the similarities in net return between this participant and the participant
displayed in Figure 4.4 (with an overall win of $2950), the strategies of deck
choice are not similar with this participant failing to converge to clearly
preferred decks as the participant displayed in Figure 4.4 has done.
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small changes in c result in large changes to the probability of deck choice,
effectively reducing the observable range of values of c to something much
narrower than −5 to 5. For reasonable imputed values of c (between 0.3 and
0.7) the imputed value was recovered approximately 67% of the time. This
suggests that although the Bayesian estimation of the EVM described here
is able to recover the imputed parameter values with reasonable accuracy,
there may be some elements of the EVM system of equations that make it
impossible to recover behaviour accurately.
Further to this, posterior predictive checks were completed for each ob-
served participant. Although the net return for each participant was gen-
erally within an expected 95% credible interval for the net return, the span
of expected net returns covered by the credible intervals were quite large
(approximately $9000, see Figure 4.6). This finding suggests that there is
a large amount of uncertainty associated with estimates gained using the
EVM and, supportive of the findings from the synthetic participants, that
it may be impossible to recover behaviour accurately. The supplementary
material has further details of the posterior predictive checks.
Participant Based Posterior Results
Of the 25 real participants, only 2 had approximately normally distributed
and reasonably localised parameter estimates. Of the remaining 69 parame-
ter estimates (23 participants), 18 were bi-modal, 12 were on the boundary
of parameter space, 7 spanned the entire parameter range and 18 non-linear
relationships between parameter estimates were observed. The posteriors,
with trace plots to display the mixing of the chains, for all participants are
presented in the supplementary material. Raftery’s dependence factor, I,
was close to 1 for all parameters for each participant suggesting that auto-
correlation between posterior samples was not a problem and that the chains
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Figure 4.6: 95% Credible intervals for the net returns for each of the 25
participants, generated from posterior predictive checks. It is clear that
although all but three credible intervals contain the observed net return, the
variability of the credible intervals is extremely large. This would suggest
that there is uncertainty surrounding the predictions from the model.
had mixed well. In addition, all MPSRF values were less than or equal to
1.1 for all but one participant, confirming convergence of the chains. The
MPSRF for the remaining participant did not reduce below 4.3, even when
8 chains with 120,000 MCMC samples each were drawn from the posterior
distribution (thinning of 10, burn-in at 2,000). Figure 4.7 shows this partic-
ipant, from the ecstasy-and-cannabis use group, has a bi-modal distribution
of estimates for parameters φ and c with no connected support between
the modes. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, when there are two or more dis-
connected modes, it becomes harder for a Markov chain to sample all of
the posterior as the chain can become ‘stuck’ in one of the modes. If this
happens, convergence statistics can be good, but only because the chain is
not aware of (or has not sampled) the remaining mode or modes. Figure
4.8 shows the mixing for the posterior in Figure 4.7 for the five separate
chains used in this analysis. This shows that two of the five chains have
sampled one mode, while the remaining three have sampled the alternate
mode, for the duration of the chain. This lends weight to the argument that
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Figure 4.7: The sampled posterior for a participant from the ecstasy-and-
cannabis use group using the Expectancy Valence Model. This reveals a
bi-modal distribution in φ and W .
the posterior may not have converged due to posterior distributions being
truly bi-modal. Bi-modal distributions such as that in Figure 4.7 cannot
be approximated well by a point estimate thus an individual’s behaviour is
best summarised by considering the full posterior distribution.
For 12 of the 25 participants, analysis using the EVM produced poste-
rior densities on the boundaries of W and/or φ. For example, Figure 4.9
shows that, for this participant, the density for φ is hard against the up-
per boundary value of one (observable in the middle of the top and bottom
rows and the left and right columns of Figure 4.9). This is in line with the
findings presented by Wetzels et al. (2010) who, due to problems with max-
imum likelihood estimation, excluded approximately 25% of each of their
four data sets due to estimates on the boundary. Rather than excluding
these observations, using the posterior mean with a credible interval here,
would provide a more reasonable estimate than an MLE (supplementary
material).
Also note the strong, non-linear relationship between parameters φ and
c in Figure 4.10. Although statistically non-linear relationships of this type
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Figure 4.8: The mixing of the posterior distribution displayed in Figure 4.7
for φ (black), W (light gray) and c (dark gray). Each block of 2000 iterations
represents one of the five thinned chains once burn-in was discarded. Two
distinct solutions are displayed, corresponding to the bi-modality observed
in Figure 4.7. Each of the five chains has sampled to one of the two modes.
Figure 4.9: The sampled posterior distribution for a participant from the
regular cannabis use group using the Expectancy Valence Model. The pos-
terior distribution provides evidence of estimates with distributions on the
boundary of parameter space.
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Figure 4.10: The sampled posterior distribution for a participant from the
ecstasy-and-cannabis use group using the Expectancy Valence Model. The
posterior distribution provides evidence of non-linear relationships between
estimates.
can be transformed and interpreted mathematically, psychologically any in-
terpretation of this sort may make little or no sense, as we elaborate in the
next section.
Psychological Inference
Results suggest that individual performance on the IGT can be mathemat-
ically described by looking at the full posterior distribution. However, the
mathematical descriptions may not be psychologically meaningful.
For the participant in Figure 4.7, the distribution of the parameter c
suggests that deck choices were either perfectly consistent or highly incon-
sistent across trials and the distribution for φ suggests that the decisions
made were either highly influenced by recent outcomes, or were influenced
solely by the initial expectancies, or a state of no knowledge. Interpreting
the relationship between φ and c suggests that the participant was either
inconsistent when memory was depleted or varied in their level of consis-
tency when memory of outcomes was good. So for this participant, it is
unclear whether he or she has a deficit in memory or not. In general, for
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Figure 4.11: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the Expectancy Valence Model. Distinct non-linear relationships be-
tween the posterior distributions of φ and c and between W and c are visible
in the bottom row and right column. There is also a lack of consistency be-
tween the results displayed in this Figure and the results displayed in Figures
4.12, 4.13 and 4.14. This is despite the fact that each of these participants
come from the same group of psychological interest.
participants with bi- or multi-modal distributions, conflicting psychological
inferences may be drawn about deficits in decision making, undermining the
application of the EVM.
Non-linear relationships between parameters also produce uncertainty
surrounding the observed relationship between the model and the measured
variables which can lead to competing and conflicting psychological interpre-
tations for individuals. The estimates provided in Figure 4.11 suggest that
the participant is either a consistent but impulsive individual with good
memory or an individual with poor memory who is inconsistent in their
choices and focuses more on losses than wins. So it is unclear where any
deficits in decision making may lie for this individual.
For the individual depicted in Figure 4.12 it appears that memory for
recent outcomes varies across the entire range of values for φ, similarly
for affective reaction to deck outcomes W . Psychologically, the goal is to
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Figure 4.12: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the Expectancy Valence Model. The posterior distribution for φ here
spans the entire parameter space (from φ = 0 through to φ = 1). There is
also a lack of consistency between the results displayed in this Figure and
the results displayed in Figures 4.11, 4.13 and 4.14. This is despite the fact
that each of these participants come from the same group of psychological
interest.
Figure 4.13: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the Expectancy Valence Model. Both the middle row and middle
column show the posterior density for φ is hard against the upper boundary
of parameter space (at φ = 1). There is also a lack of consistency between
the results displayed in this Figure and the results displayed in Figures 4.11,
4.12 and 4.14. This is despite the fact that each of these participants come
from the same group of psychological interest.
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Figure 4.14: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the Expectancy Valence Model. Bi-modality of the sampled posterior
distributions for both φ and c are evident. There is also a lack of consistency
between the results displayed in this Figure and the results displayed in
Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13. This is despite the fact that each of these
participants come from the same group of psychological interest.
make statements about levels of impulsivity or memory for this individual.
However the results in Figure 14.12 suggest that the participant may be
highly impulsive, have normal levels of impulsivity or be extremely cautious.
He or she may also have no memory for recent outcomes, have some memory
impairment or have perfect memory. With such results it is again unclear
whether the participant has displayed deficits in decision making processes
or not.
Psychologically then, the EVM provides neither clear nor consistent esti-
mates of neurological process that could be used to gain specific insight into
an individual’s decision making abilities. Instead, findings using the EVM
at the individual level seem confusing, conflicting and hard to interpret.
Group Estimates
We observed a lack of consistency within the groups of psychological interest
that were tested. Figures 4.11 to 4.14 show the sampled posterior distribu-
tions for participants from the drug na¨ıve group who should not display any
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particular deficits in the memory parameter φ (Quednow et al., 2007; Stout
et al., 2005; Parrott et al., 2007; Yechiam et al., 2005). Figure 4.13 shows
values of φ indicative of a short associative memory, while Figure 4.11 shows
values indicative of a long associative memory. Alternatively Figures 4.12
and 4.14 reveal distributions suggesting both high and low values of φ. So,
a point estimate of group performance would also carry a large associated
variance reflecting the inconsistency of individual-level parameter estimates
within the group.
Although parameter estimates obtained using the EVM across groups
have been shown to be effective in identifying differences between groups of
individuals (for example Yechiam et al. (2005)), the question is now whether
it is appropriate to do so. Figure 4.15 shows the EVM parameter estimates
for the drug na¨ıve control group which suggests that the drug na¨ıve controls
had long associative memories (φ close to 0) and this is supported by the
95% credible interval for the parameter estimates displayed in Table 4.2.
However we have already seen in Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 that this is
not necessarily the case for individual participants. In fact, out of the 11
participants in the drug na¨ıve control group, only 2 had clear estimates of
φ that were close to 0. Of the remaining 9 participants, 4 had estimates of
φ that were bi-modal, 3 spanned the entire (or close to entire) parameter
space and 2 had estimates of φ that were the complete opposite to the group
estimate. Psychologically then, the group estimate suggests long associative
memories for drug na¨ıve controls, but individual estimates suggest that up
to 9 out of the 11 drug na¨ıve controls may have deficits in memory processes.
If a group is made up of individuals with parameter estimates that are
bi-modal, non-linear, span every possible value and are inconsistent across
the group then the meaning of any group estimate is questionable. Due to
this variability in parameter estimates for participants in the same group,
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Figure 4.15: The sampled posterior distribution of the drug na¨ıve group
using the Expectancy Valence Model. Here a value of φ close to zero is
suggested, however this is in direct contrast to some of the participants who
make up the group (for example see Figure 4.13) that have estimates of φ
close to one.
Table 4.2: 95% credible intervals for W , φ and c each of the four drug using
groups.
95% credible Interval
W φ c
Group Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Drug Na¨ıve 0.56 0.77 0.00 0.39 0.53 0.62
MDMA 0.24 0.69 0.10 0.69 0.44 0.60
Cannabis 0.36 0.73 0.00 0.94 0.49 0.63
MDMA & Cannabis 0.36 0.70 0.00 0.32 0.46 0.59
Overall 0.33 0.76 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.62
any point estimate for the group may not be a true representation of this
diversity of psychological outcomes.
4.3.5 Summary
Bayesian analysis of the psychological processes underlying performance on
the IGT using the EVM did not produce localized, uni-modal or approxi-
mately normal estimates of parameter distributions. When considering the
full posterior distributions, the psychological interpretation of the results
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was contradictory, uninformative and, at times, misleading. This suggests
that there is no guarantee, when applied at the level of the individual, that
point estimates of EVM parameters are accurately measuring individual
deficits in decision making.
Using the EVM to estimate the psychological processes leading to deci-
sion making deficits in group performance may produce reasonably localised
estimates. However with individuals within the group receiving estimates
that have multiple conflicting psychological interpretations, the interpreta-
tion of any group estimate may not be truly representative of the group.
Obtaining clearer, more localised estimates for each individual may help to
reduce this variability.
4.4 Experiment 2
Measuring a single run (one run of 250 trials) on the IGT, as presented
in Experiment 1, produces a single observation for each participant. We
increased the number of runs each participant completed to ascertain if
less variable individual-level parameter estimates for an individual could be
obtained when decomposing behaviour on the IGT using the EVM.
Participants were asked to complete three runs (three runs of 100 tri-
als each) of the IGT. Even though this only provides 50 more individual
choices than in the Experiment 1, a participant must start from a state of
no knowledge three times in this experiment compared to only once in the
first. Given that the same psychological processes are responsible for the
performance on each of the three runs, instead of gaining one measure of
initial learning, there are now three measures per participant. As such, the
sample size for each participant is increased from one to three. For each
participant then, multiple sets of responses can now be used to estimate the
overall performance on the IGT for that participant. It would be expected
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that posterior distributions gained in this way would be less variable than
those observed in Experiment 1.
As with Experiment 1, we consider a random effects model of multiple
runs per participant to account for subject to subject variability.
4.4.1 Method
Participants
Eight participants were recruited using posters in the Psychology Depart-
ment at the University of Tasmania and consisted of four males and four
females, with mean ages of 37.5 (SD = 14.9) and 45.5 (SD = 17.1) respec-
tively. Any person who was over the age of 18 and reported no cognitive
deficits was able to participate and as such, this group was considered a
random group of healthy controls. Adherence to the participation criteria
was ascertained by self-report. Each participant gave informed consent and
was able to withdraw at any time without enquiry.
Materials
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was implemented using the computerized
test described by Grasman and Wagenmakers (2005). The order of presen-
tation of the four decks in the IGT was random, so a participant completing
three sequential runs would be unlikely to gain the same ordering of the
decks (Grasman and Wagenmakers, 2005). Participants were made aware
of the fact that the decks would be different each time they completed the
task. Loss amounts are also randomly presented such that the required ra-
tio of wins to losses are reached for each deck without a predictable pattern
(Grasman and Wagenmakers, 2005). Our only modification to the task was
to restrict the number of trials to 100 for the main task and to include 10
trials for a practice task.
To account for learning effects between runs, distractor tasks were em-
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ployed.
Procedure
After an initial practice run of 10 trials, participants completed the first
of three 100 trial runs after which two distractor questionnaires were com-
pleted. The second 100 trial run was then completed after which participants
completed a computerized cognitive test (a Stroop task). A third and final
run of 100 trials was then completed.
The distractor tasks employed here were used to apply some cognitive
load such that participants could not review their performance on the task
and make plans for future runs. If the distractor tasks were not successful
in achieving this, there should be sequential improvements across the runs
for the participants.
4.4.2 Results
Analysis of the psychological processes underlying performance on the IGT
was completed with the EVM and estimation of the posterior distribution
for each parameter was averaged across performance in all three runs. The
following results have been chosen as good examples of why the described
analyses of performance on the IGT are not universally effective. The indi-
vidual results presented are good examples of the described phenomena and
they are loosely representative of the entire sample. Deck selection profiles
of the three runs for each participant are provided in the supplementary
material along with posterior distributions of the parameter estimates for
the EVM for all eight participants completing the IGT.
Net Return
Initial exploration of raw data showed that for each participant the net
amount won at the end of each run varied considerably (Figure 4.16). In fact,
Figure 4.16 shows that half of the eight participants varied between gross
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Figure 4.16: The profit for each of three runs of the IGT completed by the
eight participants in Experiment 2. The large amount of variability between
runs on the IGT for each participant is apparent here with five participants
showing greater than $1400 between their smallest and largest profits.
profits and losses between runs and five of the eight participants showed dif-
ferences of greater than $1400 between their best and worst performances.
There was no consistent improvement across the runs, suggesting the dis-
tractor tasks accounted for learning effects, and instead, on any given run,
performance in terms of a net outcome varied depending on the pattern of
observed values related to deck choices. Participant 2, for example, had net
outcomes of $1400 on run 1, -$600 on run 2 and $1700 on run 3. If taken
individually, a net outcome of $1400 or $1700 would suggest good perfor-
mance, while a net return of -$600 would indicate poor performance and
neurological deficits in decision making.
The lack of consistency in the outcomes achieved on the IGT raises
some questions about the reliability of the task as a clinical tool. In fact,
reviews of the IGT by both Buelow and Suhr (2009) and more recently Lin
et al. (2013) highlight the need for better information about the reliability
of the task. We would expect, if the IGT were reliable, that participants
should achieve similar results each time they complete the task, but this is
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clearly not the case here. Further, if the differences in net return observed
in Figure 4.16 were due to systematic carry-over effects (i.e. learning) we
would expect to see participants getting better over time. Figure 4.16 shows
this is also not the case. Therefore, this may suggest an inherent problem
with the reliability of the IGT itself and further investigation into this would
be worthwhile.
Participant Based Posterior Results and Psychological Inference
Of the eight participants, two had posterior distributions that were bi-modal
in φ and c (Figures 4.17 and 4.18), three exhibited clear non-linear relation-
ships between φ and c, φ and W and/or W and c (Figure 4.17, 4.19 and
4.20) and one showed a posterior distribution spanning the entire parameter
space for φ (Figure 4.20). Convergence of the MCMC procedure was assured
with the MPSRF (Brooks and Gelman, 1998) reading below 1.1 for every
participant.
Psychological interpretation of the observed posteriors, much like in Ex-
periment 1, was still unclear. Participant 1, for example, appears to be
highly impulsive (W ) with perfect memory (φ) and moderate consistency of
choice (c) but also may have deficits in memory and have a tendency toward
focussing on wins (Figure 4.18). Here analysis of the posterior distribution
is possible but, due to contradictory results from bi-modal and non-linear
distributions, not psychologically meaningful.
Group Estimates
Figures 4.17 to 4.20 show a lack of consistency between participants in the
group, which is unexpected for a group of healthy controls (although it
should be noted that a similar result was apparent in the healthy control
group for Experiment 1). Although the bi-modality and non-linearity dis-
played in Figures 4.17 to 4.20 is not as severe as that displayed in Experiment
102
Figure 4.17: The sampled posterior distributions for participant 4 using
the Expectancy Valence Model to decompose behaviour on a multiple run
version of the IGT. This figure shows bi-modal distributions in φ and c
similar to those observed in Figure 4.6 which was based on a single run of
the IGT. There is also a lack of consistency between the results displayed in
this Figure and the results displayed in Figures 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20. This is
despite the fact that each of these participants come from the same group
of psychological interest.
Figure 4.18: The sampled posterior distributions for participant 1 using
the Expectancy Valence Model to decompose behaviour on a multiple run
version of the IGT. The posterior samples here show estimates of φ hard
against the upper boundary of 1 similar to those observed in Figure 4.8
which was based on a single run of the IGT. However, here we also see
distinct bi-modality in posterior estimates for both φ and c. There is also
a lack of consistency between the results displayed in this Figure and the
results displayed in Figures 4.17, 4.19 and 4.20. This is despite the fact
that each of these participants come from the same group of psychological
interest.
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Figure 4.19: The sampled posterior distributions for participant 2 using
the Expectancy Valence Model to decompose behaviour on a multiple run
version of the IGT. This shows estimates of the parameter c are non-linearly
related to φ. There is also a lack of consistency between the results displayed
in this Figure and the results displayed in Figures 4.17, 4.18 and 4.20. This
is despite the fact that each of these participants come from the same group
of psychological interest.
Figure 4.20: The sampled posterior distributions for participant 6 using
the Expectancy Valence Model to decompose behaviour on a multiple run
version of the IGT. This figure shows a posterior distribution for φ that
takes all possible values from 0 to 1. This is similar to that observed in
Figure 4.9 which was based on a single run of the IGT. We also see here
a non-linear relationship between the estimates for φ and c. There is also
a lack of consistency between the results displayed in this Figure and the
results displayed in Figures 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19. This is despite the fact
that each of these participants come from the same group of psychological
interest.
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1, the variability within groups is still high. This suggests that the issues
associated with using the EVM that were identified in Section 4.3.4 still
apply when the IGT is completed three times.
4.4.3 Summary
In summary, the hypothesis that there should be decreased uncertainty in
individual-level EVM parameter estimates when participants completed the
IGT three times compared to results from the single run IGT was not sup-
ported. Despite a reduction in individual uncertainty, the posterior distri-
butions were not normally distributed and, due to bi-modality and non-
linearity of estimates, produced conflicting psychological interpretations.
In Experiment 2 participants completed the IGT three times. An in-
crease to five repetitions of the IGT was considered, but due to the lack
of improvement over the three runs, this was deemed unnecessary. From a
logistical standpoint increasing the number of runs of the IGT that an in-
dividual completes, to the point where the increased sample size noticeably
decreases the uncertainty in individual-level parameter estimates, is not fea-
sible. Increasing the number of runs would make completion of the IGT
laborious for participants and lessen the likelihood of its use as a diagnostic
tool.
Inconsistency between participants in the same group, as with Experi-
ment 1, was also observed. Given the multiple, conflicting interpretations
observed at the level of the individual, it is questionable whether a simple
group estimate would truly represent the diversity of the group.
Additionally there was a lack of consistency between the net outcomes
achieved by each participant across the three runs of the IGT. This in-
consistency could not be explained by carry-over effects and as such raises
questions about the reliability of the IGT itself. Agreeing with the findings
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from Experiment 1, these findings suggest that the reliability of the IGT is
something that would benefit from further investigation.
4.5 Experiment 1 Revisited
The EVM, when applied to the IGT, aims to identify the underlying psycho-
logical processes of memory and consistency of choice that lead to deficits
in decision making. The multiple conflicting parameter estimates displayed
in Experiments 1 and 2, however, suggest that the EVM is not always able
to distinguish between different explanations of behaviour. For example if a
participant has great memory but is bored and making random choices they
may appear very similar to a participant who is trying really hard but has
terrible memory. These two situations could lead to the same observable
behaviour on the IGT and, with the same observed behaviour, it would be
impossible to tell the two situations apart.
In a study by van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011), who looked at modelling
behaviour on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), the inability to ac-
curately identify parameters was encountered when using the four parameter
BART model proposed by Wallsten et al. (2005). van Ravenzwaaij et al.
(2011) found that two of the four parameters were not identifiable and that
a reduced, two parameter model provided the best fit. Given the multi-
ple, conflicting parameter estimates of the EVM parameters when applied
to IGT data, the following experiment explores whether a reduction in the
number of parameters of the EVM may provide more accurate estimates for
the remaining parameters of the EVM.
In psychological assessment, careful standards are followed to ensure con-
sistency of test environment and optimal motivation of participants through-
out testing (Kaplan and Saccuzzo, 2012). Outside of forensic contexts, psy-
chologists generally assume optimal effort and motivation throughout test-
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ing, and psychological literature either makes this implicit assumption by
not including tests of effort or apply methods to temper the effects of inat-
tention or lack of understanding. However over a short duration task it is
reasonable to assume maximal effort and, as such, that participants have
maintained consistent effort during the relatively short duration of the IGT
presented here. Assuming consistent effort means that the consistency pa-
rameter in the EVM, c, would no longer be required to take into account
boredom or fatigue and could be held constant.
In addition, the simulations presented in Section 4.3.4 show that, al-
though parameters W and φ were recovered with reasonable precision 97%
and 94% of the time respectively, the consistency parameter c was only re-
covered 67% of the time despite the fact that c was only simulated within a
restricted band of 0.3 < c < 0.7. This adds further weight to the suggestion
that a model where c is fixed would be worth exploring.
4.5.1 The 2-Parameter Expectancy Valence Model
Assuming consistent effort across trials implies that the Consistency param-
eter c is no longer required as a measure of boredom or fatigue. However,
the choice of value for c will have an impact on the sensitivity function dis-
played in Equation 4.5 which can not be ignored. Choosing c = 0 will render
θ (t) = 1, removing the impact of the sensitivity function all together, while
c = 1 produces θ (t) = t/10 resulting in linearly increasing sensitivity to Ex-
pectancies across trials. Neither increasing sensitivity linearly across trials
or removing sensitivity to Expectancies all together are realistic reflections
of how participants are expected to respond to outcomes on the IGT. A
value of 0 < c < 1, however, results in a dampening effect where the rate
of increase in θ is relatively rapid for early trials, but decreases as the trials
continue. Incorporating this into the probability of choice (Equation 4.4),
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choosing a value of 0 < c < 1 models a lack of confidence in the Expectancies
for very early trials, but it also dampens the effect of the sensitivity func-
tion θ(t) as t becomes larger. Although enforcing an early lack of confidence
coupled with long-term dampening can be achieved, to different degrees, for
all 0 < c < 1, c = 0.5 also has some empirical evidence for its use. For three
of the four groups presented in Experiment 1, c = 0.5 was within the 95%
credible intervals for the predicted value of c (Table 4.2). In addition, when
estimating across all of the participants irrespective of group, the 95% cred-
ible interval for the predicted value of c across all of the data also contained
c = 0.5. This would suggest that, not only is c = 0.5 justifiable theoretically,
but it is also supported by the data presented in this study.
Due to theoretical and empirical evidence supporting its use, the fol-
lowing analysis was completed using a 2-parameter EVM consisting of the
sensitivity function;
θnew(t) =
√
t
10
(4.8)
for trial t, along with Equations 4.1,4.2 and 4.4. This is equivalent to the
original EVM with the c parameter set to c = 0.5.
4.5.2 Method
Participants
The data used for this analysis consists of the same data presented in Ex-
periment 1, Section 4.3.1.
To test the accuracy of the 2-parameter EVM implementation of the
model, IGT data was simulated for 361 synthetic participants across every
possible combination of 19 systematic values each for W and φ for the 2-
parameter EVM. The 2-parameter EVM was then fit to the generated data
using the formulas described above to see if the imputed parameter values
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could be recovered. As with Experiment 1, posterior predictive checks were
also completed.
4.5.3 Results
The posterior distributions of the parameter estimates for the EVM for all
of the 25 real participants, with trace plots to display the mixing of the
chains, are presented in the supplementary material. For the 2-parameter
EVM analysis, Raftery’s dependence factor, I, was close to 1 for both pa-
rameters suggesting that autocorrelation between posterior samples was not
a problem and that the chains had mixed well. In addition, all MPSRF
values were less than or equal to 1.1, confirming convergence of the chains
for every participant.
Parameter Recovery and Posterior Predictive Checks
From the 361 synthetic participants (with known values of W and φ) the
credible intervals of the posteriors contained the imputed parameter value of
W ' 97% and φ ' 96% of the time. This suggests that the Bayesian estima-
tion of the EVM described here is able to recover the pre-defined parameter
values of W and φ with a level of accuracy similar to that of the traditional
EVM. Posterior predictive checks for the 2-parameter EVM (Figure 4.21)
revealed the net return for each participant was always within an expected
95% credible interval for the net return, which is an improvement on the
results displayed in Figure 4.6. In addition, comparison of Figure 4.21 to
Figure 4.6 shows the mean predicted net return for the participants was
closer to the actual net return achieved when using the 2-parameter EVM
(MSE = 221) than when using the traditional EVM (MSE = 472). De-
spite this, the span of expected net returns covered by the credible intervals
had not reduced when compared to Experiment 1 (approximately $9000, see
Figure 4.21). As with Experiment 1, this result suggests that there is a large
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Figure 4.21: 95% Credible intervals for the net returns for each of the 25 par-
ticipants, generated from posterior predictive checks using the 2-parameter
EVM. Here all of the observed net return values were with the predicted
95% Credible intervals for the net returns, but the variability of the credi-
ble intervals is still extremely large. As with the results observed in Figure
4.6, this would suggest that there is uncertainty surrounding the predictions
from the model.
amount of uncertainty associated with estimates gained using the EVM that
may make it impossible to recover behaviour accurately and that reducing
the number of parameters does not fully address this problem.
Participant Based Posterior Results and Psychological Inference
Compared to the results using the traditional EVM in Experiment 1, using
the 2-parameter EVM resulted in all but 3 of the 25 participants receiving
posterior distributions that were reasonably localised and provided concise
estimates of W and φ. The remaining 3 participants obtained posterior
estimates of W with long tails stretching across all possible values of W .
However, there was no evidence of bi- or multi-modality, and there was also
no observable non-linearity in the joint posteriors for any participant.
Despite the generally clear and concise results, there were 6 out of the
25 participants where the estimates for φ obtained using the 2-parameter
EVM had a completely contradictory psychological interpretation than those
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Figure 4.22: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence Model. This shows estimates of
φ that are close to zero, which is in direct contrast to the sampled posterior
using the traditional EVM (Figure 4.13) in which this participant received
estimates of φ close to one.
obtained using the traditional EVM. Figure 4.22 shows that using the 2-
parameter EVM produced estimates of φ close to zero for the second partic-
ipant of group one, suggesting Expectancies dominated by previous experi-
ences. When using the traditional EVM (Figure 4.13), the same participant
received an estimate close to one, suggesting a reliance on the most recent
outcomes to inform their Expectancies. The same is true for the other five
participants who all received estimates close to zero using the 2-parameter
EVM and estimates close to one using the traditional EVM.
In addition, when using the traditional EVM, Figure 4.12 shows a pos-
terior spanning the entire range of φ and Figure 4.7 shows a bi-modality
in φ while both obtained clear estimates of φ close to zero when using the
2-parameter EVM (Figures 4.23 and 4.24 respectively). In fact 16 of the 25
participants had credible intervals spanning 0 ≤ φ < 0.1 which could suggest
that the majority of participants formed Expectancies that were not heavily
influenced by recent events.
In general, the psychological interpretation of the parameter estimates
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Figure 4.23: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence Model. This shows estimates of
φ that are close to zero, compared the sampled posterior using the tradi-
tional EVM (Figure 4.12) which shows this participant with an estimate of
φ spanning the entire range of values.
Figure 4.24: The sampled posterior distribution of a participant from the
ecstasy-and-cannabis use group using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence
Model. This shows estimates of φ that are close to zero, compared the
sampled posterior using the traditional EVM (Figure 4.7) which shows this
participant with bi-modal estimates of φ.
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Figure 4.25: The sampled posterior distribution of a participant from the
cannabis use group using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence Model. This
shows concise posterior distributions that have a clear psychological inter-
pretation.
derived using the 2-parameter EVM are clearer and tell a more consistent
story than the traditional implementation of the EVM. The posterior in
Figure 4.22, for example, suggests an individual with reasonable memory
but with a tendency to focus more highly on wins than losses, where as
Figure 4.25 suggests someone with a more balanced consideration of win
and loss experiences. A such, by producing narrower, reasonably localised
posteriors, the estimates at the level of the individual are more exact and
easier to interpret.
Group Estimates
In general, there was more consistency between participants within all of the
groups than the results displayed in Experiment 1. Despite the increased
consistency within groups, Figures 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28 show there were still
some individuals with estimates of W lying outside of the group estimates
displayed in Table 4.3. These relative outliers may have contributed to the
increased uncertainty observed in the W parameter estimates in Table 4.3
in comparison to the results in Experiment 1 (Table 4.2).
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Figure 4.26: The sampled posterior distribution of a drug-na¨ıve participant
using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence Model. The estimate for W for
this participant is outside of the estimate for the drug-na¨ıve group displayed
in Table 4.3.
Figure 4.27: The sampled posterior distribution of a participant from the
cannabis use group using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence Model. The
estimate for W for this participant is outside of the estimate for the cannabis
using group displayed in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.28: The sampled posterior distribution of a participant from the
ecstasy-and-cannabis use group using the 2-parameter Expectancy Valence
Model. The estimate for W for this participant is outside of the estimate
for the ecstasy-and-cannabis use group displayed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Credible intervals for W and φ for each of the four drug using
groups presented in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3.
95% credible Interval
Experiment 1 Experiment 3
W φ W φ
Group Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Drug Na¨ıve 0.56 0.77 0.00 0.39 0.33 0.73 0.02 0.09
MDMA 0.24 0.69 0.10 0.69 0.38 0.96 0.00 0.11
Cannabis 0.36 0.73 0.00 0.94 0.10 0.69 0.03 0.24
MDMA & Cannabis 0.36 0.70 0.00 0.32 0.30 0.77 0.01 0.08
4.5.4 Summary
Using a 2-parameter EVM to interpret performance on the IGT resulted
in more localized, uni-modal, approximately normal estimates of parame-
ter distributions than using the traditional EVM. These results were more
clearly psychologically interpretable than those presented in Experiment 1
as there was no evidence of bi-modality or non-linearity in the posteriors.
As such, the 2-parameter EVM is able to provide clearer, more easily in-
terpretable findings that the traditional EVM when used as to interpret
performance on the IGT.
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However, part of the problem associated with the traditional implemen-
tation of the EVM was that it was not always able to distinguish between
different explanations of behaviour. Specifically, it could not distinguish
between a bored participant with great memory or a participant who was
trying really hard but had terrible memory. In the 2-parameter implemen-
tation of the EVM, results were clearer and more easily interpretable but,
due to the reduced number of parameters, it is still unable to distinguish
between these different explanations of behaviour.
Posterior predictive checks of the implementation of the 2-parameter
EVM also suggested that there may be a lack of consistency in net outcomes
when using the IGT. This is in line with the findings from Experiment 1
which also showed highly variable net outcomes were possible when using
the same parameter values to simulate performance on the IGT. The reli-
ability of the IGT is, therefore, something that would benefit from further
investigation.
4.6 Discussion
The presented results highlight two main issues, the first of which is with
the reliability of the IGT itself. Both Buelow and Suhr (2009) and Lin
et al. (2013) raised concerns about the reliability of the IGT and, with the
lack of consistency in net return experienced on the IGT across the three
Experiments presented here, the current study agrees that the reliability of
the IGT needs further investigation. In addition, due to the observed lack
of consistency on repeated measurement within the same individual, we do
not recommend using frequency of deck choice or net outcomes to measure
individual performance on the IGT.
If basic analysis of performance on the IGT, such as net return and
frequency of deck choice, are not recommended, then cognitive models of
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performance such as the EVM must be employed. This leads to our sec-
ond main issue: That the EVM does not clearly measure the underlying
psychological processes driving observed performance on the IGT.
Irrespective of whether a participant completed the IGT once or multi-
ple times, the EVM, when used to decompose performance on the IGT, did
not produce the localized, uni-modal or approximately normal parameter
distributions required to accurately summarise behaviour. The distribu-
tions produced were often so variable as to include every possible parame-
ter value, rendering psychological interpretations of posterior distributions
inconsistent and contradictory. These multiple, conflicting parameter es-
timates suggest that the EVM is not always able to distinguish between
different explanations of behaviour. In addition, conflicting outcomes be-
tween members of the same group were observed, along with summaries of
group performance that contradicted the individual outcomes of the mem-
bers who made up that group. Both of these results are further evidence that
the EVM is not always able to distinguish between different explanations of
behaviour.
When reducing the traditional EVM to a 2-parameter EVM, in which
the consistency parameter is set at c = 0.5, improvements in the uncertainty
of estimates were observed. The 2-parameter EVM produced more localized,
uni-modal, approximately normally distributed estimates of parameter dis-
tributions than using the traditional EVM, allowing for clearer psycholog-
ical interpretation of results. There was also greater consistency between
results for participants in the same psychological group when using the 2-
parameter EVM, leading to group estimates that represented the diversity of
behaviours present in the group more fully than when using the traditional
EVM. Despite these improvements, there was still some uncertainty sur-
rounding estimates of the W parameter when using the 2-parameter EVM
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and further investigation into reduced parameter models would be advisable.
Highly variable individual-level parameter estimates could be evidence
of mathematical models that do not measure the behaviour they are as-
sumed to measure. The 2-parameter EVM presented here has gone some
way towards investigating if this is the case with the EVM when applied to
IGT data. However, Chiu and Lin (2007) suggest that the IGT may not be
measuring the behavioural deficits it was designed to measure and, if this is
the case, then the EVM cannot be expected to reliably capture those traits.
Apart from the issues identified in this chapter in relation to the reliability of
the IGT, Steingroever et al. (2013a) suggest that there may also be a flaw in
the fundamental assumptions associated with the creation of the IGT. Ste-
ingroever et al. (2013a) show that even healthy participants display highly
idiosyncratic choice behaviours when completing the IGT, challenging the
assumption by Bechara et al. (1994) that healthy participants initially ex-
plore the decks and then move to the behaviour of exploiting the decks they
have learned are the best. Steingroever et al. (2013a) suggest that individ-
uals do not move away from the initial exploration stage when completing
the IGT and hence highly idiosyncratic choice behaviours, like those ob-
served in the current study, predominate (Figures 4.2 and 4.5). As such,
it would appear that the decision making processes required to complete
the IGT successfully are more complicated than first thought. Even recent
alternatives to the EVM such as the Prospect Valence Model (Ahn et al.,
2008, 2011) have been unable to provide good fits to all patterns of choice
behaviours (Steingroever et al., 2013b).
The findings presented in this and recent studies show clear evidence that
there may be problems with both the EVM and the IGT and, to improve the
clinical utility of this popular task, it is worth investigating how to improve
them both. The current study provides evidence that highlights a potential
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lack of reliability in the IGT itself. In addition, using simple measures of
performance on the IGT, such as net return or frequency of deck selection,
was found to be an ineffective way to measure decision making deficits in
individuals or at group level. The EVM, when used to measure deficits in
the underlying psychological processes required for completion of the IGT,
provides multiple, conflicting parameter estimates which suggest that the
EVM is not always able to distinguish between different underlying reasons
for observed behaviour. As such, the current study warns against its use at
both the level of the individual and at the level of the group. A reduced
parameter EVM, such as the 2-parameter EVM presented in this chapter,
may provide clearer and more consistent results than using the EVM. How-
ever, a reduced parameter EVM can not address the inability of the EVM
to distinguish between different, competing psychological explanations of
behaviour and investigations into a model that may be able to address this
issue would be supported.
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Chapter 5
Supplementary Material for
The Expectancy Valence
Model of the Iowa Gambling
Task: Can it produce
reliable estimates for
individuals?
The Supplementary Material provides the deck selection profiles and pos-
terior distributions (with mixing) for all three experiments and posterior
predictive checks and group posterior distributions for Experiment 3 are
provided.
5.1 Posterior Predictive Checks
Posterior predictive checks test whether a model is an adequate descrip-
tion of the observed data it is trying to describe. The steps of a Posterior
predictive check can be summarised as follows:
1. Fit the model to the observed data and gain posterior distributions
for the model parameters.
2. Draw samples from the posterior distributions for the parameters.
3. Using the samples from the posterior, generate (using the model) sim-
ulated data sets.
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Figure 5.1: Posterior predictive check results the EVM as applied in Section
4.3.4.
4. Compare the simulated and observed data sets on a reasonable test
statistic that summarises the data.
In this way it is possible to check if the model describes the data well.
In this chapter, posterior predictive checks were completed by randomly
sampling 1, 000 parameter values from the posteriors gained for the param-
eters of the EVM and 2-parameter EVM for each of the 25 participants.
The sampled parameter values were then used to simulate 1, 000 data sets
that mimicked a 250 choice IGT trial. Let’s call each of the 25 sets of 1, 000
IGT runs (one for each participant) the “simulated data”. The mean and
95% confidence interval was then obtained for the net return for each of the
simulated data and this was compared to the net return obtained by the
true participant.
5.2 Experiment 1
5.2.1 Posterior Predictive Checks
The results are displayed in Figure 5.1:
Figure 5.1 shows that, for all but three of the participants, the observed
net return is within the confidence interval for the net return generated
from the simulated data. This would imply that the model fits the data
121
1 
Mean 
Observed 
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 11 0 111 201 202 203 301 302 303 304 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 
Participant 
Figure 5.2: Deck selection profiles for Participants 101 through 104.
well, however looking at the values on the y-axis is cause for concern. On
average, the confidence intervals for the net return from the simulated data
span just under $9,000. This would imply that there is a large amount of
uncertainty attached to the observed parameters, which is in line with the
rest of the results presented in this chapter.
5.2.2 Deck Selection Profiles
Figures 5.2 through 5.8 are the deck selection profiles for all participants
in Experiment 1 (Section 4.3). A circle represents a choice from the corre-
sponding deck label on the left of the figure and if the circle is filled, then a
loss was experienced. The participant numbers are provided in the header
for each figure. The first number of each participant number indicates group
inclusion where group 1 are drug na¨ıve controls, group 2 are regular users
of MDMA, group 3 are regular users of cannabis and group 4 are regular
users of both MDMA and cannabis. Each participant completed the IGT
once with 250 deck selections.
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Figure 5.3: Deck selection profiles for Participants 105 through 108.
Figure 5.4: Deck selection profiles for Participants 109 through 111
123
Group 1 - Participant 05 
. ! 
Group 1 - Participant 06 
, l• C ~ B 
. 
--- - -----
" I 
"" . l 
Group 1 - Participant 07 
, l• C ~ B 
' 
··1 1. n ···········, r·· ,·· . , · · · 1ri :·· ,···j ..... 
j • o o o • j ~ I; • • • 
I r ( I 
o o o o o o O O O O lo~ O O O O r O O .! I O oool O O O O O O • 0 0 0 0 O !ooo! 0 0 0 · ~ 
Group 1 - Participant 08 
, l• C ~ B 
. 
I " I , I 
11· 
Group 1 - Participant 09 
, l• C ~ B 
. !. l.:! l .. !. .. 1 
Group 1 - Participant 10 
Group 1 - Participant 11 
o 1 o 1 o o o ! o 00:0000 00 00000:0 I ~ coo 
l l !!. ! ! ! . 
Figure 5.5: Deck selection profiles for Participants 201 through 203.
Figure 5.6: Deck selection profiles for Participants 301 through 304.
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Figure 5.7: Deck selection profiles for Participants 401 through 404.
Figure 5.8: Deck selection profiles for Participants 405 through 407.
125
Group 4 - Participant 01 
1 111 . . · i • 1 • 1 . I •• ;i . 1 •• l •1 ! . ' .. I . ! I .· 111 • · 1 . 1 • · ; · ;; ! 
0 i . A i ,h • 10 • I~ 0 . I ~ r ,h •• <) Q • •• 0 <) • 0 i . 0 • i O Q . ~ j O. r . 1A~ • OJ 11 ~ O Q 00 i "I i Q 1i 
o or . lo 11 L o •o o! o~ o! o ol of o o Ho !LL. r l ! o iLtL ! oo ! o• ~ i ~ ooo o!'. o oco o f if'. ! ~ ~1'! o rHf 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! . - ! : ! : l ! ! . ! ! : . ! ! ! ! ! ! l ! ! d ! ! . Id : . !l . 1 ! l ! . : 
Group 4 - Participant 02 
, l• C ~ B 
. 
; . 
. . . L . l 
•• 1 
- - - ---c-, e,..,,.,,00 -,0 0000 _ __ co _ oo_ e,o,oo, 
I I I I I I I I 
. ! J !. 
Group 4 - Participant 03 
, l• C ~ B 
' 
• 
0 i " Ai 0 ! i • i "" 
t "°" "'°" o, "" ! ! ., o oo l co 
• •rr - 1,- i •r 1 
! ! ! -
; ·· ·-- -
. ! .. ! 
Group 4 - Participant 04 
, l• C ~ B 
. 
······i. !! .. 1 . . .If 
0 i: s 
• •• •• • • - • -·- • __ 11 __ ••• •• 
- ! . J j 
000 o 000,Q O 0:0 \ 0 ~ Q ! 00 
OCOOOOO QOOCOOCOOOCOOO '° ) Q O 
- ! 
Group 4 - Participant 05 
, l• C ~ B 
. 
11 "'1, _ /, o:oo co ooo 1-. I 
Group 4 - Participant 06 
··1 . "" 
. . l. 
- i 
J •• . ! :1 - ! . ! . :t 
Group 4 - Participant 07 
l • 
- . J 
. ! ! n. 
5.2.3 Posterior Distributions
Figures 5.9 through 5.15 are the sampled posterior distributions for the
parameters of the EVM for the all participants completing the IGT in Ex-
periment 1 (Section 4.3). These are pairwise plots in which the three upper
diagonal panels are a reflection of the three lower diagonal panels. Across
the central diagonal, the mixing for each of the three parameters (W , φ and
c) is presented. This is the mixing for all five MCMC chains concatenated
together such that the first 2,000 samples correspond to the first chain, the
second 2,000 samples to the second chain and so on. The participant num-
bers are provided in the header for each figure. The first number of each
participant number indicates group inclusion where group 1 are drug na¨ıve
controls, group 2 are regular users of MDMA, group 3 are regular users
of cannabis and group 4 are regular users of both MDMA and cannabis.
Each participant completed the IGT once with 250 deck selections. In this
Experiment, participants completed the IGT once with 250 deck selections.
5.2.4 Group Performance
Figure 5.16 shows the sampled posterior distributions for the parameters of
the EVM for each of the four groups completing the IGT in Experiment 1
(Section 4.3). These are pairwise plots in which the three upper diagonal
panels are a reflection of the three lower diagonal panels. Across the central
diagonal, the mixing for each of the three parameters (W , φ and c) is pre-
sented. This is the mixing for all five MCMC chains concatenated together
such that the first 2,000 samples correspond to the first chain, the second
2,000 samples to the second chain and so on. The group numbers are pro-
vided in the header for each figure where group 1 are drug na¨ıve controls,
group 2 are regular users of MDMA, group 3 are regular users of cannabis
and group 4 are regular users of both MDMA and cannabis.
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Figure 5.9: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
101 through 104
.
Figure 5.10: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
105 through 108
.
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Figure 5.11: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
109 through 111
.
Figure 5.12: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
201 through 203
.
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Figure 5.13: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
301 through 304
.
Figure 5.14: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
401 through 404
.
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Figure 5.15: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
405 through 407
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5.3 Experiment 2
5.3.1 Deck Selection Profiles
Figures 5.17 through 5.24 are the deck selection profiles for all participants
in Experiment 2. A circle represents a choice from the corresponding deck
label on the left of the figure and if the circle is filled, then a loss was experi-
enced. The participant numbers are provided in the header for each figure.
All participants in this study were drug na¨ıve controls. Each participant
completed the IGT three times with each of the three runs comprising 100
deck selections. The three runs are each presented separately here.
5.3.2 Posterior Distributions
Figures 5.25 and 5.26 are the sampled posterior distributions for the param-
eters of the EVM for the all participants completing the IGT in Experiment
2. These are pairwise plots in which the three upper diagonal panels are a
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Figure 5.17: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 01.
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Figure 5.18: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 02.
Figure 5.19: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 03.
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Figure 5.20: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 04.
Figure 5.21: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 05.
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Figure 5.22: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 06.
Figure 5.23: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 07.
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Figure 5.24: Deck selection profiles for all three runs completed by Partici-
pant 08.
reflection of the three lower diagonal panels. Across the central diagonal,
the mixing for each of the three parameters (W , φ and c) is presented. This
is the mixing for all five MCMC chains concatenated together such that the
first 2,000 samples correspond to the first chain, the second 2,000 samples to
the second chain and so on. In this experiment, participants completed the
IGT three times with each of the three runs comprising 100 deck selections.
5.4 Experiment 3
5.4.1 Deck Selection Profiles
Experiment 3 was completed by analysing the same data presented in Ex-
periment 1, but implemented a reduced parameter version of the EVM. For
this reason, the deck selection profiles of the 25 participants are exactly the
same as those presented in Section 5.2.2.
5.4.2 Posterior Distributions
The following figures are the sampled posterior distributions for the pa-
rameters of the 2-parameter EVM (in which c is held constant) for the all
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Figure 5.25: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
01 through 04
.
Figure 5.26: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
05 through 08
.
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Figure 5.27: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
101 to 104
.
participants completing the IGT in Experiment 1. These are pairwise plots
in which the two upper diagonal panels are a reflection of the two lower
diagonal panels. Across the central diagonal, the mixing for each of the two
parameters (W and φ) are presented. This is the mixing for all five MCMC
chains concatenated together such that the first 2,000 samples correspond
to the first chain, the second 2,000 samples to the second chain and so on.
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Figure 5.28: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
105 to 108
.
Figure 5.29: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
109 to 111
.
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Figure 5.30: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
201 to 203
.
Figure 5.31: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
301 to 304
.
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Figure 5.32: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
401 to 404
.
Figure 5.33: Sampled posterior distributions (with mixing) for Participants
405 to 407
.
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Chapter 6
Quantifying performance on
the Balloon Analogue Risk
Task.
6.1 Introduction
When using any sort of model of behaviour, the goal is to link the param-
eters of the model with the underlying cognitive processes that give rise to
observed behaviour. This is usually with the view to use the parameter es-
timates to either infer something about an individual’s cognitive processes
or gain some sort of representative, average estimate of the cognitive per-
formance for a group of individuals. Empirical models, which are driven by
the patterns in the data rather than mechanistic models of how the data
has arisen, may not be able to provide any clear links back to the cognitive
processes underlying observed behaviour. Mechanistic models, which are
developed based on the theories surrounding the cognitive processes which
give rise to observable behaviour, are therefore often favoured over their
empirical counterparts. However, there is also a possibility that mechanistic
models based on complex models of cognitive processes have been incorrectly
specified or specified in such a way that the observed behaviour can not be
described by a unique combination of the model parameters. This inabil-
ity to specify parameters was exactly what we observed in Chapter 4 when
considering the Expectancy Valence Model (EVM) of the Iowa Gambling
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Task (IGT). The solution presented in Chapter 4 was to simplify the model,
allowing for a less complex description of the individual’s behaviour, but the
question of whether this a true measurement of an individual’s behaviour
remains. Given the IGT requires such a complex system of cognitive pro-
cesses to produce behaviour, it may be the case that it is just not possible
to tease apart those cognitive processes by modelling the single observed be-
haviour of deck choice. Perhaps then, the solution is to look for a cognitive
task which relies on a less complex system of cognitive processes to produce
behaviour; instead of expecting one task to answer multiple questions about
cognitive deficits, simplify our expectations and test one (or two) cognitive
processes at a time.
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) is theorised to assess risk
seeking behaviour alone (Lejuez et al., 2002), making the BART a relatively
simple task compared to the IGT. In this way, modelling the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying performance on the BART should be less complex than
for the IGT. The following chapter will investigate whether using this cogni-
tively less demanding task makes it easier to decompose behaviour using a
less complex mechanistic model than the EVM of the IGT. The van Raven-
zwaaij et al. (2011) two-parameter BART (2pB) model of behaviour will be
assessed with the main aim being to ascertain if parameter estimates can
be gained with enough accuracy to be useful at the level of the individual.
A new, empirical model of behaviour on the BART, the Basic Response
Model (BRM), is constructed based solely on the patterns in the observed
data and is proposed as an alternative to the 2pB model. The BRM is
then extended to a more complex model, using our understanding of par-
ticipants behaviour on the task rather than our observations in the data,
as a second potential alternative to the fully mechanistic 2pB model. The
Run Dependent Response Model (RDRM), is therefore an example of the
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fusion between mechanistic and empirical models. Whether the BRM and
RDRM may have any use in modelling cognitive deficiencies at the level of
the individual will also be explored.
The focus on the accuracy of the considered models at the level of the
individual has particular importance in a clinical context. Clinically, the
goal of psychological assessment is to ascertain if an individual may have
some cognitive deficit requiring treatment or support of some kind. It is not
unreasonable to think that individuals presenting for assessment may have
cognitive deficits that give rise to behaviour outside of, or more extreme
than, what is considered normal. In these cases the models used to measure
possible cognitive deficits need to be able to accurately identify behaviours
away from the normal range of results, in the extreme edges of performance.
When measuring group performance, these extreme performers are labelled
as outliers and their results are often ignored or averaged out in various
statistical ways to lessen their impact on the overall results (see Chapter
4 for examples). However, for a model to be of clinical use, these outliers
must be able to be measured as accurately as any other performer in the
group. For this reason, this chapter will be a focus on the ability of the
considered models to accurately identify performance away from normal, in
the extreme.
6.2 The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
The BART, developed by Lejuez et al. (2002), is a computerised psycho-
logical assessment tool in which participants are presented with a virtual
balloon and asked to blow it up by pressing a key on the computer. With
each key press (or pump), the balloon increases in size and the participant
wins a small amount of money. However, if the participant pumps up the
balloon too far and it bursts, the participant wins nothing and moves onto
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the next trial (another balloon). As participants have been instructed to
maximise the amount of money they win, they must decide whether to keep
pumping up the balloon, or whether to stop and “cash in” the balloon before
it bursts and then move on to the next trial. As such, this task is designed
to measure impulsivity or risk taking behaviour with impulsive individuals
pumping the balloon up, more often (and observing more bursting balloons
over multiple trials) than their more conservative counterparts (Hunt et al.,
2005).
Unbeknown to the participants, the probability of the balloon bursting
is uniformly distributed across all possible outcomes (usually the number
of allowable pumps are capped to around 128, but participants do not dis-
cover this unless they pump up to the maximum) (Lejuez et al., 2002). A
uniform distribution ensures that the probability of the balloon bursting is
less obvious to the participant than if, for example, bursts were normally
distributed about some mean. This means that, although there is techni-
cally still an expected value that participants can learn to maximise their
win (ideal pump amount = (m− 1)/2 for a maximum allowable number of
pumps m), this does not become clear to an individual until many trials
have been completed. As such, it is arguable that the cognitive processes
associated with memory do not have the same impact on performance when
completing the BART as they do on more complex tasks such as the IGT.
It is the unexpected behaviour of apparently random bursting of the bal-
loon (which is very unlike a real balloon would arguably behave in the real
world) that strips back the cognitive processes and levels the playing field
for those with differing memory and knowledge abilities. This is the exact
thing that allows the BART to be a simpler task than the IGT and, theo-
retically, measure impulsivity alone. In addition, in many experiments the
number of trials on the BART completed by the participants is quite low
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(around 20) meaning that convergence to an “optimal” form of performance
does not have time to develop. Compared to the EVM then, the BART de-
mands a less complex system of functional cognitive processes to complete
the task and, therefore, a less complex cognitive model to explain observed
behaviour.
6.2.1 The Automatic BART
The original implementation of the BART by Lejuez et al. (2002), of which
a simplified version is still broadly in use (see Capone et al. (2016); Lauriola
et al. (2013); Peacock et al. (2013); Reynolds et al. (2006) for examples),
relies on individuals pressing a button repeatedly to blow up the balloon.
Several studies have found that, over relatively few trials, participants be-
come bored with the pumping required and converge to a very low number
of pumps before cashing in the balloons (Pleskac et al., 2008). When consid-
ering that the balloon bursts are uniformly distributed from (0,m), where
m is some number close to 130, participants who continually cash in on a
very low number of pumps are unlikely to see many balloons which burst.
This makes modelling extremely difficult as behaviour under loss conditions
is rarely measured.
To address this problem, the Automatic BART was suggested as an al-
ternative implementation by Pleskac et al. (2008). In the automatic BART,
rather than pressing a button repeatedly to manually pump up the balloon,
participants are asked to enter the number of pumps they would like to
pump into a box (the cash in point). The balloon is then automatically
pumped up until it either bursts or automatically cashes in when it reaches
the number set by the participant. In this way, participants can quickly
pump the balloon a large number of times reducing boredom, increasing
the number of observed bursts and allowing for more accurate modelling of
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behaviour (Pleskac et al., 2008). It also provides extra information over the
traditional BART because you can measure the participant’s intent on each
trial. Whether the balloon bursts or not, you know how many pumps the
participant intended to make. For these reasons, the current analyses are
completed on the automatic BART.
6.3 Mechanistic models of behaviour
Despite the decreased cognitive processes required to complete the BART
compared to tasks such as the IGT (as discussed in Section 6.2), com-
plex cognitive models of behaviour have been proposed with Wallsten et al.
(2005) suggesting a four-parameter model of behaviour. When completing
the BART, an individual is required to complete several trials (k ∈ (1, N))
in which each trial consists of a balloon that needs to be pumped up until
it is either cashed in or it bursts. Each trial, the participant must choose
how many times they are going to pump up the balloon (l ∈ (1,m)) be-
fore cashing in. The four-parameter BART model is designed to predict
the probability of the individual pumping up the balloon on trial k for each
pump opportunity l. To achieve this, the four-parameter BART was de-
signed from theoretically-based assumptions, the first of which is that each
participant believes there is a probability that a pump will make the balloon
burst, defined as pbeliefk for trial k, that is updated each trial (balloon). As
the participant moves through the trials, pbeliefk is updated such that:
pbeliefk = 1−
α+
∑k−1
K=0 n
success
K
µ+
∑k−1
K=0 n
pumps
K
with α > µ. (6.1)
Here
∑k−1
K=0 n
success
K is the number of pumps that have not burst (successes)
up to trial k, while
∑k−1
K=0 n
pumps
K are the total number of pumps up to trial
k. In this way, α provides a baseline weighting for success, while µ provides a
baseline weighting for loss which means together 1−α/µ can be interpreted
as a measure of the participant’s prior belief that the balloon will burst.
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The next assumption is that the amount of pumps that the participant
believes is optimal does not change throughout the task. Although this fact
may not be relevant to the Automatic BART, the model described here
utilises data from the original BART implementation in which participants
are asked to manually press a button for each pump of a balloon. The
number of pumps considered optimal by the participant is denoted ωk for
trial k and is expressed
ωk =
−γ+
ln
(
1− pbeliefk
) with γ+ ≥ 0. (6.2)
This incorporates both the participant’s belief that the balloon will burst
(as presented in Equation 6.1), and the participant’s propensity for risk
taking γ+ on trial k. Within trial k, each time a participant pumps (l)
is an observation of the participant’s overall decided pump amount ωk and
the how strongly the participant adheres to this value. The probability of
the participant pumping on any pump l is therefore a probabilistic process
based around ωk. As such, the probability of pumping the l
th time on the
kth trial can be denoted
ppumpk,l =
1
1 + expβ (l − ωk) with β ≥ 0 (6.3)
where β is a measure of the participant’s behavioural consistency. These
assumptions were modelled in such a way as to provide information about
an individual’s baseline weighting for the likelihood of success and loss, the
participant’s propensity for risk taking and the participant’s behavioural
consistency.
van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011), however, showed that the four-parameter
model proposed by Wallsten et al. (2005) was unable to be solved uniquely
in some contexts. Much like the problems described in Chapter 4 for the
EVM of the IGT, van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) showed the four-parameter
BART models complexity resulted in non-unique estimates of the α and µ
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parameters that had potentially conflicting cognitive interpretations. van
Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) proposed that a two-parameter version of the
model was more successful.
6.3.1 The Two-parameter van Ravenzwaaij Model
In the two-parameter van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model Equation 6.1,
probability pbeliefk , is fixed across all trials. Given that p
beleif
k ∈ (0, 1), Equa-
tion 6.2 can now be written as:
ωk = α, with α ≥ 0 (6.4)
where α is a rescaled version of γ+. This means Equation 6.3 is now
ppumpk,l =
1
1 + expβ (l − α) . (6.5)
So the two-parameter model of the BART (2pB) relies on two parameters
α and β where β ∈ (0, 1) and, with balloon pumps capped at m pumps,
α ∈ (0,m). The parameter α then represents the point at, above which,
the individual believes the balloon is more likely to burst than not. For
example, a participant with α = 40 would be more likely to cash in their
balloon post-40 trials (l > 40) than before. To measure the individual’s
conviction in the α cut-off value, β is included to either soften or strengthen
the rate at which the probability of pumping changes across pumps (the
participant’s behavioural consistency). For example, taking our individual
with α = 40, if they also had β = 0.05 that would suggest they were not
confident in this cut-off value and their probability of cashing in would not
change greatly from l = 38 to l = 42. A β = 0.9 alternately would see an
immediate shift from a probability of cashing close to zero, to a probability
of cashing close to one over the same interval.
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6.4 Empirical models of behaviour
As an alternative to the two-parameter mechanistic model (2pB) proposed
in Section 6.3, two empirical models of performance on the BART were also
developed and are presented in this Chapter.
Empirical models are formed, instead of being based on the cognitive
theory underlying behaviour, by being led by the data itself. A model is first
created to explain the observed data and then links are drawn between the
fitted parameters and the potential cognitive processes they may represent.
Importantly, the links to cognitive processes are drawn after the model has
been decided. As discussed in Section 3.1, although this may increase the
ability of finding a model that is identifiable, this does not guarantee a model
that will link well to the cognitive processes which give rise to the observed
behaviour.
6.4.1 Basic Response Model
Starting with the most basic, one step ahead prediction model, the Basic
Response Model (BRM) is based on data from Automatic BART tasks. Led
entirely by the data, rather than the cognitive processes underlying it, it
seeks to explain increases and decreases in the number of pumps guessed
based on the events that the participant has experienced.
Assuming that the actual number of pumps guessed on trial k + 1,
Pumpk+1 will be normally distributed around some expected value µ with
some standard deviation σ, we can expect
Pumpk+1 ∼ N (µk+1, σ) . (6.6)
If we consider the prediction for the expected value µk+1 of the number of
pumps on trial k + 1, we get
µk+1 = Pumpk + δkD + (1− δk) I (6.7)
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where Pumpk is the number of pumps actually guessed on trial k and
δk =
{
1, if Pumpk resulted in a burst
0, if Pumpk did NOT result in a burst.
In this way
D < 0 shows a decrease in number of pumps after a burst
D = 0 shows no change in number of pumps after a burst
D > 0 shows an increase in number of pumps after a burst
while
I < 0 shows decreases in pumps after a success
I = 0 shows consistent number of pumps after a success
I > 0 shows an increase in number of pumps after a success.
The parameter D empirically models the change to the number of pumps
chosen following unsuccessful results. However, a clear link between D and
psychological behaviour is also clear as it measures how a loss, or bursting
balloon, effects behaviour. More risk averse individuals should decrease their
number of pumps following a burst while impulsive individuals may increase
their pump guess. As such, D can be seen as measuring risk aversion or
impulsivity.
Also measuring increases and decreases in response to the outcomes of
the task, I is concerned with behaviour following wins (or successful cash
ins). Similarly to the D parameter, I also has clear links to psychological
behaviour with participants who gain great confidence from a win more
likely to increase subsequent pump guesses by a large amount whereas a
lack of confidence may see decreases even in face of a win.
With D representing impulsivity following a loss and I confidence after
a gain, the parameter σ measures how closely an individual’s pump guesses
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are to those estimates. Small values of σ models increases and decreases to
pump guesses that are close to the preferred values of D and I, where as
large values of σ allows more variability in pump guesses on each trial. In
this way, σ can be thought of as a measure of behavioural consistency.
Of course, the BRM does assume that both D and I are constant across
all trials and yet it is realistic to think this may not be a fair assumption.
As a participant on the task encounters sequential trials where the balloon
doesn’t burst, it would be reasonable to think their behaviour may change.
As such, a more complex model that models this behaviour was considered.
6.5 Where Empirical and Mechanistic Models Meet
The Basic Response Model (BRM) is essentially summarising the most sim-
ple empirical features of the BART data that are presented; how big the
subsequent increases and decreases are in response to observed trial out-
comes. It is not hard to imagine, however, that the choices a participant
makes when completing the task are more complex than a simple increase or
decrease rule. You can imagine that, as the number of trials without a burst
increases, an individual may become more confident and take bigger risks.
For others, an increased run of wins may result in more cautious increases
in expectation of a burst. The next model we suggest then, the Run Depen-
dent Response Model (RDRM), takes the BRM and incorporates a feature
designed to capture some of this increased complexity. As such, we have
an empirical model which has been extended to include a meausre of our
theories surrounding observed behaviour, which are mechanistic in nature.
So, in the RDRM we see one example of where empirical and mechanistic
model may converge.
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6.5.1 Run Dependent Response Model
The Run Dependent Response Model (RDRM), like the BRM, uses one step
ahead predictions to estimate the pump amount on trial k+ 1, based on the
results of the previous trials. However, it also takes into account if there
has been a run Rk of wins or successful cash ins in a row. The number of
pumps predicted for trial k + 1 is therefore described as
µk+1 = Pumpk + δkD + (1− δk) IRφk (6.8)
where, just as in the BRM,
δk =
{
1, if Pumpk resulted in a burst
0, if Pumpk did NOT result in a burst
and D and I are as described for the BRM in Section 6.4.1. The dif-
ference between the BRM and the RDRM is that the parameter I is now
multiplied by Rk, which is the run or the number of trials since the last
burst was observed. The run, Rk has power φ which can take the following
values:
φ < 0 shows decreases in magnitude of pump guesses as run length increases
φ = 0 shows a constant magnitude of pump guesses, independent of run
length (this is the BRM)
φ > 0 shows an increase in magnitude of pump guesses as run length increases
φ = 1 shows a linear increase in magnitude of pump guesses as run length
increases.
For the RDRM then, although I is still concerned with modelling be-
haviour following wins (or successful cash ins), the addition of the parameter
φ attached to information about the run of successful trials enables this be-
haviour to be more trial dependent.
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By taking into account the number of successful trials in a row, and
modelling the impact of that on future guesses, the level of confidence ex-
perienced by the participant can now change across trials. In this way, the
φ parameter should enable us to tease apart individuals whose confidence
increases following sequential wins from those who become more cautious
by multiplying the constant I by the transformed Rk.
6.6 Method
Parameter recovery simulation studies were conducted separately for each
of the considered models of behaviour on the BART. Data was simulated
across reasonable values (defined separately below) for each of the considered
models and then, using the same model which generated the data, it was
ascertained if the model parameters could be recovered with any level of
accuracy.
All statistical analysis was conducted using the statistical software R
(The R Development Core Team, 2009), and the code for all computations
is available by contacting the author directly.
Two-parameter BART (2pB)
In their simulation studies, van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) used β = 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and γ+ = 0.6, 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.2 as the values for which data was gen-
erated. Given that we are particularly interested in looking at the extremes
of behaviour, β = 0.05, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.95 was considered and, given that
α is a rescaled version of γ+ (Section 6.3.1, Equation 6.4) where
α = −γ+ 1
ln (a)
, a ∈ (0, 1) ,
we considered α = 5, 10, 20, 50, 80, 95.
For each possible combination of α and β, data was simulated for 100
synthetic participants using the 2pB model proposed by van Ravenzwaaij
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et al. (2011) (Equation 6.5). Each synthetic participant completed a 250 trial
version of the BART with a maximum allowable pump guess of 130 pumps.
Once the data was simulated, optimisation of the negative log likelihood
surface (using a Nelder-Mead optimisation algorithm in the optim function
in R) was completed and the parameter estimates for α and β stored. The
log likelihood was generated for across trials k and pump opportunities l
for all trials nk and all pump opportunities within trials nl(k) based on the
probability of data D:
P (D|α, β) =
nk∏
k=1
nl(k)∏
l=1
ppumpk,l
(
1− ppumpk,nl(k)+1
)dk
(6.9)
where dk = 0 if the balloon burst on trial k, dk = 0 otherwise and p
pump
k,l
is as defined in Equation 6.5. The distributions of the parameter estimates
for each parameter combination were then analysed and are presented in
Section 6.7.1.
Basic Response Model (BRM)
Simulation values considered for the BRM included every combination of
D = −20,−15,−10,−5, 0 with I = 0, 5, 10, 15, 20. For each unique combina-
tion (25 in all), 100 synthetic participants were created simulating responses
over a 100 trial version of the Automatic BART (maximum allowable pump
of 130). Each pump guess then was simulated using a normal distribution
with mean defined by the BRM (Equation 6.7) and standard deviation gen-
erated at three levels: σ = 1, 5, 10.
Once the data was simulated, optimisation of the negative log likelihood
surface (using a Nelder-Mead optimisation algorithm in the optim function
in R) was completed and the parameter estimates for D, I and σ recovered.
Rearranging Equation 6.7, we can see that to estimate parameters D
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and I we need
µk+1 − Pumpk = δkD + (1− δk) I.
Of course, we don’t observe µk+1 directly, but this can be approximated
with
Pumpk+1 − Pumpk ≈ δkD + (1− δk) I. (6.10)
Here we are estimating the change (Changek+1) between pumps k+1 and k
with either D on trials where the balloon burst or with I when the balloon
was successfully cashed in. In this way, the likelihood can be completely
decoupled with estimates for D and I reliant on non-overlapping results.
Although the observed pumps are discrete in nature, there are 99 dif-
ference scores for each generated data set used to estimate the parameters
in the BRM (100 trials per simulated participant). Given the large N for
each optimisation, and that a normal distribution was used to simulate the
data, it is fair use a normal distribution to model the observed distribution
of difference scores.
So to estimate the parameters D, I and σ, we maximise the negative log
likelihood
− log(L(D, I, σ|Change)) = (6.11)
−
N−1∑
k=1
δk log(P(Changek+1|D,σ2))
−
N−1∑
k=1
(1− δk) log(P(Changek+1|I, σ2))
where P is the cumulative probability of the normal distribution and N is
the total number of trials.
The distribution of the parameter estimates for each parameter com-
bination of D, I and σ were then analysed and are presented in Section
6.7.1.
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Run Dependent Response Model (RDRM)
Simulation values considered for the RDRM included every combination
of D = −15,−10,−5, 0 with I = 0, 5, 10, 15 and φ = −1, 0, 0.5, 1.5. For
each unique combination (64 in all), 100 synthetic participants were created
simulating responses over a 100 trial version of the Automatic BART (max-
imum allowable pump of 130). Each pump guess then was simulated using
a normal distribution with mean defined by the RDRM (Equation 6.8) and
standard deviation generated at three levels: σ = 1, 5, 10.
Once the data was simulated, optimisation of the negative log likelihood
surface (using a Nelder-Mead optimisation algorithm in the optim function
in R) was completed and the parameter estimates for D, I and φ recovered.
The distribution of the parameter estimates for each parameter combination
were then analysed and are present in Section 6.7.1.
Rearranging Equation 6.8, we can see that to estimate parameters D, I
and φ we need
µk+1 − Pumpk = δkD + (1− δk) IRφk .
Similarly to Equation 6.10, we don’t observe µk+1 directly, but this can be
approximated with
Pumpk+1 − Pumpk ≈ δkD + (1− δk) IRφk . (6.12)
However, unlike the BRM, the likelihood for the RDRM can not be com-
pletely decoupled due to the relationship between I and φ. So, assuming the
differences can be approximated using a normal distribution (as described
for the BRM), the Change observed for trial k+1 can be estimated as using
Changek+1 ∼ N
(
δkD + (1− δk) IRφk , σ
)
So to estimate the parameters D, I, φ and σ, we maximise the negative
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log likelihood
− log(L(D, I, φ|Change)) =
−
N−1∑
k=1
δk log(P(Changek+1|D, I, φ, σ2))
(6.13)
where P is the cumulative probability of the normal distribution and N is
the total number of trials.
The distribution of the parameter estimates for each parameter combi-
nation were then analysed and are presented in Section 6.7.1.
6.6.1 Model Comparison
Because the 2pB is not nested within the BRM or RDRM, comparison be-
tween the model fits is not straight forward. In an article by Wagenmakers
et al. (2004), a process is described for comparing non-nested models such
as these making use of the Goodness of Fit statistics (here the AIC is used)
from parametric bootstrap samples. This is termed model mimicry and
looks at how well different models can explain the variability in data gener-
ated using the model itself and the models it is being compared to. In the
process suggested by Wagenmakers et al. (2004), they began with a non-
parametric bootstrap from the observed data. However, given that the data
in this study was entirely simulated, the following process begins with data
simulated across a full range of parameter values:
Model Mimicry Stages
1. Fit both model A and B to the simulated data and gain parameter
estimates θA and θB, Goodness of Fit (GOF) values GOFA and GOFB
and the difference in GOF ∆GOFAB
• ∆GOFAB is GOFA−GOFB. The difference in AIC between the
models A and B when fit to the original data.
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2. Generate data XA with model A using parameter estimates θA and
generate data XB using model B using parameter estimates θB
3. Fit both model A and model B to both XA and XB gaining estimates
θXA,A, θXA,B and θXB ,A, θXB ,B
4. Ascertain Goodness of Fit (GOF) statistics for each of the fitsGOFXA,A,
GOFXA,B and GOFXB ,A, GOFXB ,B
5. Look at the difference between GOF for the samples ∆GOFXA,AB and
∆GOFXB ,AB
• ∆GOFXA,AB is GOFXA,A − GOFXA,B. The difference in AIC
between models A and B when fit to the data simulated using
θXA,A and θXA,B .
This is then repeated many times for each of the possible combinations
across the three models, resulting in a distribution of differences in the GOF
values. If the distribution of values is mainly negative, then model A must
be preferred, where model B is preferred if the distribution is positive. If the
models can mimic each other well, there may be no clear preference between
models (the distribution is centred around zero) but it would be expected
that there should be some preference toward the model which simulated the
data. For example, ∆GOFXA,AB should be negative, suggesting a preference
for model A as this is the model that created the data here.
The original GOF values can also be compared to the simulated distri-
butions to ascertain which model is fitting the data best in which scenario.
Figure 6.1 shows an example of how the original data may be classified us-
ing the differences in GOF distributions. Looking at the distributions of
∆GOFXA,AB and ∆GOFXB ,AB concurrently will allow the overlap between
these distributions to be measured. Ascertaining where the original data
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∆GOFAB falls in relation to this distribution allows for cross classification
of the original data. If the data was created using process A, then the
∆GOFAB should fall inside the distribution for ∆GOFXA,AB and, should
there be enough distinction between ∆GOFXA,AB and ∆GOFXB ,AB, this
will allow for it to be correctly identified as being created using model A. If
there is too much overlap between ∆GOFXA,AB and ∆GOFXB ,AB however,
the ability to classify ∆GOFAB will be lost.
Figure 6.1: The probability densities for a hypothetical ∆GOFXA,AB and
∆GOFXB ,AB. On the left is the ∆GOFAB from the data generated using
model A and the ∆GOFAB from the data generated using model B is on the
right. If model A is true, then the ∆GOFAB from the original data should
fall within the left distribution while, if model B is true, it should fall in
the right. The purple dotted line represents an example of a ∆GOFAB that
would suggest model A is preferred.
Wagenmakers et al. (2004) also showed that, using the standard de-
viation of the distributions allows the formation of a selection rule ascer-
taining the distribution from which the ∆GOFAB may have come from.
For ∆GOFXA,AB and ∆GOFXB ,AB we obtain means µA and µB and stan-
dard deviations σA and σB respectively. Assuming here that µA < µB and
µA−2∗σA < µB−2∗σB then if x∗ (an individual observation from∆GOFAB)
is less than µB−2∗σB then the data is preferring Model A. If x∗ > µA+2∗σA
then Model B is preferred. In the case that µA−2∗σA ≥ µB−2∗σB, then ei-
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ther there is too much similarity between the ∆GOFXA,AB and ∆GOFXB ,AB
distributions and x∗ can not be classified, or x∗ can be classified as prefer-
ring Model A and never B due to the nesting of the distribution of B within
A.
In the current implementation, the 25 parameter combinations across the
values D = −20,−15,−10,−5, 0 with I = 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 for the BRM were
used to simulate one set of base data while 36 parameter combinations across
α = 5, 10, 20, 50, 80, 95 and β = 0.05, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.95 for the 2pB were
to simulate the second base set of data. Twenty data sets were simulated
for each parameter combination for each set of data (500 and 720 in total
respectively). The two models, 2pB and BRM were then fitted to each set of
the base data, parameter values stored and a further 20 data sets simulated
for each of the parameter values obtained (10,000 and 14,400 data sets in
all, respectively). The parameter values were then obtained for the 10,000
and 14,400 data sets and the AIC calculated for each fit using the formula
AIC = 2k − 2× log likelihood. The values of k used were as follows:
k =
{
2, 2pB (α, β)
3, BRM (D, I, σ)
(6.14)
The difference between AIC values were then calculated and compared
across the 25 groups of 400 similar samples for the BRM base data and
across the 36 groups of 400 similar samples for the 2pB base data.
6.7 Results
6.7.1 Parameter Recovery
Two-parameter BART (2pB)
Before analysing any data for the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model,
the relationship between the parameters α and β were investigated. As a
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reminder, from Equation 6.5, we are estimating α and β from the equation
ppumpk,l =
1
1 + expβ (l − α)
where l is the current pump (l ∈ (1, 130)) on trial k. Figure 6.2 shows the
relationship between α and the probability of cashing in for different values
of β. With the current pump set to l = 50, it is clear from Figure 6.2
that moving relatively small distances from l results in dramatic changes in
probability for many values of β. In fact, any β > 0.5 is hard to distinguish
from one another at α values only ±10 away from l.
Figure 6.2: The relationship between α and the probability of cashing in for
different estimates of β on the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model.
The current pump l = 50 is set for illustrative purposes.
Consider a situation where an individual has α = 70. This is not a
particularly extreme value when the number of pumps l on any given trial
k have a maximum of m = 130. Yet Figure 6.3 shows that, in this case,
it would be extremely difficult to identify the difference between β values
greater than 0.25. Irrespective of whether l is set to 50 or 70, when β is small,
the probability profiles become so close to one another that the difference
between them is hard to see. Once an individuals random error is added
in, this will make it incredibly difficult to ascertain the correct estimate
for β, irrespective of well α is estimated. Similarly to the demonstrated
α = 70, β > 0.25 is not considered an extreme value and so this situation is
161
0 
(X) 
0 
~ 
~ ID • 0.05 0 • 01 ij 
ro 0.25 
-" E' 
" 
05 
[l_ 0 
• 0.7 
• 0.9 
N 
0 
0 
0 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
a. 
one in which an individual with parameters within the range of reasonable
consideration may be hard to identify.
Figure 6.3: The relationship between α and the probability of cashing in for
different estimates of β on the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model.
The current pump l = 50 is set for illustrative purposes. A line is drawn
at the α = 70 line to highlight the increasing difficulty in differentiating
between the different β values as values of α move further from l. This
makes estimation of β more difficult.
In addition to the potential inability to identify β for a large range of α
values, Figure 6.4 displays the probability of cashing in for an estimate of
β = 0. The flatness observed in the β = 0 line shows an equal probability
of cashing in for any pump l for trial k making it impossible to tell which α
value the individual may have. Although β = 0 is truly an extreme value,
Figure 6.5 highlights that there also may be identifiability problems of β.
When β takes values < 0.3 or > 0.8, Figure 6.5 shows it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish between the lines for α = 10, 30, 45 or
α = 55, 70, 90. Values of β > 0.8 may be considered somewhat extreme,
but values of 0.3 < β < 0.8 are well within a reasonable range of expected
values. Couple that with the reasonable values of α = 30, 45, 55, 70 and
these plots again highlight a potential problem. Reasonable values of the
parameters in the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model may be hard to
identify precisely.
The parameter recovery simulations confirmed that there may be a prob-
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Figure 6.4: The relationship between α and the probability of cashing in for
different estimates of β on the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model.
The current pump l = 50 is set for illustrative purposes. A line is drawn
at the β = 0 line to highlight that very low values of β can flatten the
probability to a point where it is hard to distinguish where l resides. This
in turn makes it harder to estimate α.
Figure 6.5: The relationship between β and the probability of cashing in for
different estimates of α on the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) model.
The current pump l = 50 is set for illustrative purposes. For high values of
β, it is clear that large or small values of α become harder to distinguish.
lem with identifiability in this model with both α and β hard to recover for
certain values. Figure 6.6 shows that it is an interaction between the val-
ues of the two parameters that make the recovery of parameter values less
accurate for combinations of α and β. Specifically, for simulated values of
α ≥ 50, as parameter values of β increased the recovery of β became less
accurate with some estimates more than 0.35 different to the value used to
simulate the data.
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Figure 6.6: The pattern of change in the estimates of β across the imputed
α values for the two parameter van Ravenzwaaij model.
Table 6.1: Number of converged maximum likelihood estimates recovered
for pairs of α and β estimates on the 2pB van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011)
model.
α
β 5 10 20 50 80 95
0.05 15 17 20 23 25 25
0.2 17 23 21 24 24 24
0.4 22 18 22 24 24 24
0.6 22 12 24 24 24 24
0.8 14 14 24 24 24 24
0.95 8 17 24 24 24 24
Figure 6.7 highlights that α was generally recovered more accurately than
β, except when β values were small. In this case, the α estimates became
increasingly more variable, with some estimates 20 points different to the
value used to simulate the data, highlighting the uncertainty surrounding
the estimate. Given the relationship between α and β ≈ 0 displayed in
Figure 6.5, this lack of identifiability around small β was expected.
Basic Response Model (BRM)
Before analysing the results of the BRM, the viability of the generated data
first had to be ascertained. When asking an individual to complete a psy-
chological assessment tool, if the individual completes the task in such a
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Figure 6.7: The pattern of change in the estimates of α across the imputed
β values for the two parameter van Ravenzwaaij model. The y-axis here has
been constrained to be between −20 and 20 to better illustrate variability at
smaller intervals. That means some outliers are not visible in the β = 0.05
plot.
way that viable data can not be obtained, it is often excluded from anal-
yses. In the case of the generated data if an individual run did not see at
least five balloons burst or cash in successfully at least five times, then the
data was excluded from analyses. Practically this would reflect an individ-
ual who cashes in their pumps on the first pump for a very large number
of trials or who guesses the maximum number on almost every trial. In
both of these cases, it would be assumed that either the participant did not
understand the instructions of the task, did not want to participate or has
some extreme cognitive reason for their behaviour which warrants further
investigation outside of the task.
Table 6.2 shows the number of simulated data sets which were considered
viable (contained at least five each of balloon bursts and successful cash-ins)
for each parameter combination of D and I. The only times that less than
100% of the simulated data sets were viable occurred when either D = 0
or I = 0. Intuitively, given that D = 0 results in no change to the pump
amount guessed following a decrease and, alternately, I = 0 results in no
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Table 6.2: Number of viable data sets available for analysis for pairs of D
and I estimates on the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 1, 5 and 10).
Non-viable data sets were only observed in the cases where either D = 0
or I = 0 and, in all but five cases, greater than 95% of simulated data sets
were viable.
σ = 1 σ = 5 σ = 10
I
D 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
-20 88 100 100 100 100 79 100 100 100 100 97 100 100 100 100
-15 89 100 100 100 100 87 100 100 100 100 98 100 100 100 100
-10 98 100 100 100 100 88 100 100 100 100 98 100 100 100 100
-5 100 100 100 100 100 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0 100 100 99 100 97 95 99 97 99 95 100 100 100 99 100
change following a successful cash in, this result is not unexpected. In both
of these cases we would expect to see convergence to the maximal or minimal
allowable pump amount, more so if the corresponding I or D value is quite
large. Couple this with the fact that the initial pump guess Pump1 was
drawn from a uniform distribution Pump1 ∼ U(1, 130) it is quite possible
that some simulated data sets would start close to the maximum or minimum
allowable pump amount and then converge quite quickly to the maximum
or minimum. This, of course, would result in very few bursts or very few
successful cash-ins dependant on the combinations of parameters and an
associated decrease in the number of viable data sets.
Given that only five parameter combinations observed in Table 6.2 had
less than 95% of data sets returned as viable, and that the lowest number of
viable data sets was 79 (D = −20, I = 0, σ = 5), there was a large enough
sample size for each parameter combination for analyses to be completed.
When considering the difference between the imputed D and I values
and those that were recovered across the simulated data, Figure 6.8 (when
σ = 1) shows the distribution of the differences tightly clustered around zero
suggesting accurate parameter recover in the majority of cases. However,
despite the generally tight clustering around zero, both histograms in Figure
6.8 are skewed with some recovered parameters up to 10 units different to
the value used to create the data.
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Figure 6.8: The difference between the recovered D and I values and the
inferred values for the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 1). The majority
of all observations (98.1%) were recovered within ±5 units with a large peak
in Difference values either side of zero.
Despite the skewed results, Figure 6.8 shows that 99.2% (2449/2469) of
the D values and 97.0% (2396/2469) of the I values were recovered within
±5 units. These high numbers suggest that, despite a few skewed results,
there was a reasonable level of accuracy in parameter recovery in general.
The skewed results of the differences observed in Figure 6.8 are also
observable in Figure 6.9, where σ = 5, but with the increased σ value the
amount of skew appears less extreme. The tight peak observed around zero
in Figure 6.8 has softened in Figure 6.9 and the histogram is appearing
more normally distributed. This pattern continues in Figure 6.10 where the
histograms look much more normally distributed and the skew is far less
extreme.
Similarly to the results for σ = 1, when σ = 5 or σ = 10 there was
still a reasonable level of parameter recovery in general. When σ = 5,
D was recovered within ±5 units 98.8% (2408/2437) of the time with I
recovered 98.0% (2389/2437) of the time. Similarly, when σ = 10, D was
recovered 99.0% (2467/2492) and I was recovered 98.3% (2449/2492) of
the time within ±5 units. This suggests that the majority of the time,
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Figure 6.9: The difference between the recovered D and I values and the
inferred values for the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 5). The majority
of all observations (98.4%) were recovered within ±5 units.
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Figure 6.10: The difference between the recovered D and I values and the
inferred values for the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 10). The majority
of all observations (98.6%) were recovered within ±5 units. The histogram
of differences here appears to be approximating a normal distribution more
closely than those displayed in Figures 6.9 and 6.8.
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parameters are well recovered and that it is in only a relatively small number
of cases that there was decreased predictive accuracy.
To ascertain where the skewed results in Figures 6.8 through 6.10 might
be coming from, Tables 6.3 through 6.5 shows the average D, I and σ values
recovered in the σ = 1, 5 and 10 cases for all combinations of D and I.
There are two main patterns that seem to appear throughout these tables
1. As σ values increase, the recovery of all three parameters D, I, and
σ becomes less accurate for values closer to zero and more accurate
otherwise.
2. Parameter values appear most difficult to recover (especially in the
cases where σ = 1 and to a lesser extent when σ = 5) when either
D = 0 or I = 0 and the alternate parameter is at the extreme (such
as in the D = 0/I = 20 or D = −20/I = 0 case).
Investigating these patterns further, Figures 6.11 through 6.13 consider
the distribution of the differences between the values of D and I used to
simulate the data and those that were recovered using the BRM. Confirming
the patterns suggested across Figures 6.8 through 6.10 and in Tables 6.3 and
6.4, Figure 6.11 shows the majority of the box plots have an inter-quartile
range reflective of the relatively small standard deviation (σ = 1) used when
simulating the data. This is with the clear exception of when either D = 0
or I = 0. However, in those circumstances, the zero estimate (whether it
be for D = 0 or I = 0) was well recovered with the increased variability
observed in the alternate parameter. In addition, the alternate parameter
was recovered with greater accuracy the closer it was to zero, suggesting
that the hardest cases to recover were when D or I was most different from
the corresponding I = 0 or D = 0 parameter.
As expected, corresponding to the increased σ value, the inter-quartile
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Table 6.3: The average value of D (to one decimal place) recovered for pairs
of D and I estimates on the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 1, 5 and
10). The average estimate of D is close to the imputed value in the majority
of cases with the largest differences observed when either D = 0 or I = 0.
When I = 0, D appears hardest to recover as |D| becomes large but also
becomes more accurate as σ increases.
Recovery of D
I
D 0 5 10 15 20
σ = 1
-20 -16.3 -19.3 -19.9 -19.9 -20.0
-15 -13.1 -14.9 -15.0 -15.0 -15.0
-10 -9.3 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0
-5 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
σ = 5
-20 -16.1 -19.0 -19.7 -19.9 -20.0
-15 -13.0 -14.8 -14.9 -15.1 -15.0
-10 -9.4 -9.9 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0
-5 -5.0 -5.0 -5.1 -5.1 -5.0
0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9
σ = 10
-20 -18.0 -19.3 -19.7 -19.9 -20.1
-15 -14.0 -4.5 -15.1 -15.0 -15.0
-10 -9.8 -10.0 -10.0 -10.1 -9.9
-5 -5.4 -5.3 -5.2 -5.3 -5.2
0 -0.9 -1.2 -1.4 -1.7 -1.8
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Table 6.4: The average value of I (to one decimal place) recovered for pairs
of D and I estimates on the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 1, 5 and
10). The average estimate of I is close to the imputed value in the majority
of cases with the largest differences observed when either D = 0 or I = 0.
When D = 0, I appears hardest to recover as I becomes large but also
becomes more accurate as σ increases.
Recovery of I
I
D 0 5 10 15 20
σ = 1
-20 0.6 5.0 10.0 15.0 19.9
-15 0.4 5.0 10.0 15.0 19.9
-10 0.2 5.0 10.0 15.0 19.8
-5 0.1 5.0 10.0 14.8 19.3
0 0.1 4.9 8.9 11.8 14.4
σ = 5
-20 0.8 5.0 9.9 15.0 19.8
-15 0.7 5.1 9.8 15.1 19.8
-10 0.6 5.0 10.1 14.9 19.5
-5 0.4 5.1 10.0 14.6 18.9
0 0.3 5.0 9.2 12.5 15.4
σ = 10
-20 1.9 5.4 10.1 14.9 20.0
-15 1.5 5.3 10.4 14.9 19.8
-10 1.4 5.2 9.8 15.1 19.3
-5 1.1 5.2 10.1 14.4 18.3
0 1.1 5.5 9.4 13.3 17.2
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Table 6.5: The average value of σ (to one decimal place) recovered for pairs
of D and I estimates on the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 1, 5 and
10). The average estimate of σ is close to the imputed value in the majority
of cases with the largest differences observed when either D = 0 or I = 0
and when σ = 1. The largest differences are specifically observed when σ
is small and the imputed values for D and I are furthest from one another
(for example D = −20/I = 0).
Recovery of σ
I
D 0 5 10 15 20
σ = 1
-20 3.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1
-15 2.6 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1
-10 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
-5 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.5
0 1.5 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.9
σ = 5
-20 4.4 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9
-15 4.4 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.9
-10 4.5 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0
-5 4.7 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0
0 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.4
σ = 10
-20 8.4 9.3 9.7 9.7 9.9
-15 8.4 9.5 9.8 9.8 9.8
-10 8.7 9.7 9.9 9.9 9.6
-5 8.9 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.4
0 9.5 9.2 8.7 8.5 8.3
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Figure 6.11: The difference between the recovered D (on the left) and I
values and the imputed values for the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 1)
for each combination of D and I. More variability is clearly observed when
recovering the D parameter if I = 0 while more variability is observed when
recovering the I parameter when D = 0. There is an observable pattern
here where variability is largest when the difference between estimates is
most extreme (for example D = −20/I = 0 and D = 0/I = 20).
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range of the box-plots are wider in Figure 6.12 than those in Figure 6.11
but Figure 6.12 still shows that parameter recovery became more difficult
when either the imputed values of D or I were equal to zero. Although less
obvious in Figure 6.12 than in Figure 6.11, the same pattern of decreased
accuracy in recovering the non-zero D or I parameter is matched to well
recovered corresponding I = 0 or D = 0. However, when the standard
deviation is increased to σ = 10, this pattern is much less visible (Figure
6.13).
Not only does Figure 6.13 lack the obvious pattern of increased variabil-
ity associated with recovering parameters equal to zero observed in Figures
6.11 and 6.12, but it also lacks some of the more extreme individual differ-
ence scores. In both Figures 6.11 and 6.12 the inter-quartile range of values
associated with D = 0 or I = 0 crosses over the line marking estimates as
being more than 5 units from their imputed value. This is not the case in
Figure 6.13 where only the tails of the distribution cross that line. This
would seem to suggest that, with the increased variability across some pa-
rameter estimates, that parameter estimates are simultaneously becoming
more localised in the extremes.
Whether the standard deviation used to simulate the data was σ = 1
(Figure 6.8), σ = 5 (Figures 6.9), or σ = 10 (Figure 6.10), the parameter
values used to create the data were always recovered within a reasonable level
of uncertainty. However it is obvious there are some problems recovering
parameter values for low σ values when either D = 0 or I = 0 (Figures 6.11
and 6.12).
Run Dependent Response Model (RDRM)
As with the procedure for the 2pB and BRM, before analysing the results
of the RDRM, if an individual run did not see at least five balloons burst
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Figure 6.12: The difference between the recovered D (on the left) and I
values and the imputed values for the BRM (with standard deviation σ =
5) for each combination of D and I. More variability is observed when
recovering the D parameter if I = 0 while more variability is observed when
recovering the I parameter when D = 0. As observed in Figure 6.11, when
the estimates of D and I were most different from each other, recovery was
most variable.
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Figure 6.13: The difference between the recovered D (on the left) and I
values and the imputed values for the BRM (with standard deviation σ = 10)
for each combination of D and I. The difficulty observed in Figures 6.12
and 6.11 in estimating D when I = 0 or estimating I when D = 0 is no
longer obvious here.
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or cash in successfully at least five times, then the data was excluded from
analyses. This process revealed 88.2% (5645/6400) cases as viable.
Figures 6.14 to 6.16 show the differences between the imputed param-
eters of the RDRM (using σ = 1, 5 or 10 respectively) and those recovered
using maximum likelihood estimation. In general, the parameters D and
I are well recovered within a reasonable band of error and, similar to Sec-
tion 6.7.1, as σ increases, the histogram appears to approximate a normal
distribution more closely.
Despite the accuracy associated with the D and I parameters, there are
clear problems with the accuracy associated with recovering φ. Although
the majority of estimates in Figures 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 are close to zero,
long tails in all three Figures suggest complications in some cases.
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Figure 6.14: Histogram of the differences between the imputed parameter
values of the RDRM with standard deviation σ = 1 and those recovered
using maximum likelihood estimation. Although both D and I are recovered
with good accuracy, there appears to be some cases in which large differences
between the imputed values of φ and those recovered are observed.
Given that the relationship between the parameters D, I and φ is three
dimensional, teasing out why the estimates of φ are more extreme than ex-
pected requires cosideration of the joint distribution of parameter estimates.
Figures 6.17 through 6.25 show the distribution of the recovered parameters
in pairwise fashion for all three implementations at σ = 1, 5 and σ = 10.
The pattern throughout all of the parameter recovery studies, that φ
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Figure 6.15: Histogram of the differences between the imputed parameter
values of the RDRM with standard deviation σ = 5 and those recovered
using maximum likelihood estimation. Although both D and I are recovered
with good accuracy, there appears to be some cases in which large differences
between the imputed values of φ and those recovered are observed.
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Figure 6.16: Histogram of the differences between the imputed parameter
values of the RDRM with standard deviation σ = 10 and those recovered
using maximum likelihood estimation. Although both D and I are recovered
with good accuracy, there appears to be some cases in which large differences
between the imputed values of φ and those recovered are observed.
was occasionally difficult to estimate, is confirmed in Figures 6.17 through
6.25. In addition however, as observed in Figure 6.19 for example, recovery
of φ tended toward large, negative estimates.
When considering Equation 6.8:
µk+1 = Pumpk + δkD + (1− δk) IRφk ,
the reason for these results may become more clear. Focusing on the IRφk ,
it is clear that a large, negative estimate of φ would mean Rφk → 0 and, as
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such, can be a proxy for an I = 0 estimate. The lack of identifiability in
these cases is observable across all standard deviations implemented with
large negative values of φ observable when σ = 5 and 10 in Figures 6.22 and
6.25 as well as in the σ = 1 case displayed in Figure 6.19.
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Figure 6.17: σ of 1, comparison between D and I for the RDRM with grey
lines overlaid at the imputed values. The recovery of the parameters appears
accurate with the most variability (obvious on the scale of the axes) in the
D = 0 or I = 0 cases.
Apart from the lack of identifiability surrounding φ in some cases, Fig-
ures 6.17 through 6.25 confirm the general ability to recover parameters
accurately that was observed in Figures 6.14 through 6.16. Most distribu-
tions of results are centred around the imputed values, especially in Figures
6.17, 6.20 and 6.23 when the joint distribution of D and I parameters are
displayed.
6.7.2 Model Comparison
We have observed problems in estimating the φ parameter of the RDRM
(Section 6.7.1), and given the similarity between the BRM and RDRM mod-
els, the following analysis looks at the model comparison between the 2pB
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Figure 6.18: σ of 1, comparison between D and φ for the RDRM with grey
lines overlaid at the imputed values. The recovery of parameters appears
generally accurate with the exception of some large, negative estimates of φ
in every comparison.
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Figure 6.19: σ of 1, comparison between φ and I for the RDRM with grey
lines overlaid at the imputed values. The recovery of parameters appears
generally accurate with the exception of some large, negative estimates of φ
when I = 0.
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Figure 6.24: σ of 10, comparison between D and φ for the RDRM with grey
lines overlaid at the imputed values. The recovery of parameters appears
generally accurate with the exception of some large, negative estimates of
φ.
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Figure 6.25: σ of 10, comparison between φ and I for the RDRM with grey
lines overlaid at the imputed values. The recovery of parameters appears
generally accurate with the exception of some large, negative estimates of φ
when I = 0.
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and the BRM.
Using the parameter combinations for the 2pB and BRM defined in
Section 6.6, 20 data sets were simulated for each of the unique parameter
combinations for both the 2pB (720 data sets in total) and the BRM (500
data sets in total). Both the 2pB and BRM were then fit to all of the data
and their parameters estimates stored. This also provided the measurements
for ∆GOF2pBvBRM on both the 2pB and BRM data (AIC is used as the
GOF measure). From here, the estimates were used to simulate twenty new
data sets each (14,400 for the 2pB and 10,000 for the BRM) and then both
models were fit back to all of the new data. This provided the estimates for
the ∆GOFX2pB ,2pBvBRM and ∆GOFXBRM ,2pBvBRM for each of the original
2pB and BRM data sets.
Of the original 720 data sets simulated using the 2pB, 25 times the
optimiser failed to converge to a solution when ascertaining the parameter
estimates. This reduced the size of the original data set to 695 and, of the
14,400 data sets created using the 2pB from these, 482 times the optimiser
failed to converge to a solution. This reduced the total number of data
sets for analysis using the 2pB to 13,918. Similarly, although the optimiser
converge for all 500 of the original data sets simulated using the BRM, the
optimiser failed to converge when fitting the parameters of the 2pB to the
data simulated using its own estimates 622 times. This reduced the total
number of data sets from 10,000 to 9,378 in the set of data originally created
using the BRM.
The ∆GOFAB values for the fits to the original base BRM data showed
a preference for the 2pB model over the BRM (median (m) = −224, inter-
quartile range = IQR[−396,−95]) and when the base data was simulated us-
ing the 2pB (m = −329, IQR[−468,−206]). Table 6.6 shows that this pref-
erence for the 2pB continued when looking at the full the full ∆GOFXA,AB
184
Table 6.6: Median and inter-quartile range (IQR) statistics for the difference
in AIC (∆GOFXA,AB) for all model comparisons across both simulated data
sets. The preference for the 2pB over the BRM is obvious from the negative
values in the distributions.
∆GOFXA,AB
2pB base data
∆GOFX2pB ,2pBvBRM m = −60, [−114, 2]
∆GOFXBRM ,2pBvBRM m = −160, [−228,−100]
BRM base data
∆GOFX2pB ,2pBvBRM m = −266, [−336,−194]
∆GOFXBRM ,2pBvBRM m = −111, [−182,−48]
distributions also.
However, even though the 2pB was preferred, the parameter estimates
gained from the 2pB fits generally created probability functions that sug-
gested random choices within the simulated data. Table 6.7 shows that the
parameter estimates for α for the 2pB, whenever the BRM was used in any
way to simulate the data, were often beyond the maximum number of al-
lowable pumps in the BART (higher than 130). These high α were coupled
with extremely low β estimates which result in a relatively flat probability
of cashing in across all possible pumping values. A probability density of
this type would manifest in extremely random choices of when to cash in
the balloon. So, even though the 2pB may have been preferred (in terms of
Goodness of fit) over the BRM, it is mainly because it is predicting a lack
of pattern in the behaviours observed in the simulated data.
The estimates for the BRM also showed some unexpected unexpected
results if the 2pB was used to simulate any of the data it was fitting to.
When the base data was simulated using the 2pB, the parameter estimates
for I in the BRM were extremely low and tightly distributed around zero.
With a corresponding low median for D this would suggest that the majority
of the pumping behaviour was being modelled by σ. This pattern seems to
continue when the BRM simulated the base data but the second simulation
was using the 2pB. Although the estimates for D and I are within the range
185
Table 6.7: Median and inter-quartile range ([IQR]) statistics for the param-
eter estimates for the 2pB and BRM across both data simulations. The
base data used for the model comparisons were either 2pB or BRM and,
from that data, the 2pB and BRM were fitted (Fitted Model) and a second
set of data simulated using the fitting models. The parameter recovery was
then completed for both the 2pB and BRM across all simulated data. It
is clear that both models recover more accurately when the base data were
created by the model that simulated them suggesting these models do not
mimic each other well. When the base data were simulated using the 2pB,
the BRM’s I parameter gave the most unexpected results with small values
centred around zero. When the base data were simulated using the BRM,
the 2pB’s α parameter inflated beyond the maximum number of pumps for
the task and were coupled with very low β estimates suggesting flat proba-
bility functions and random participant choices.
Simulated Using
2pB BRM
Base Fitted
2pB 2pB α m = 50, [10, 80] m = 130, [71, 1258]
β m = 0.55, [0.24, 0.82] m = 0.04, [0.00, 0.10]
BRM D m = −1, [−12.3, 0.0] m = −1, [−16.7, 0.0]
I m = 0.0, [−0.2, 0.3] m = 0, [−0.1, 1.7]
σ m = 4.3, [2.5, 14.3] m = 4.2, [2.4, 9.8]
BRM 2pB α m = 156, [133, 185] m = 155, [137, 178]
β m = 0.04, [0.03, 0.05] m = 0.04, [0.03, 0.05]
BRM D m = −10, [−16.2,−5.5] m = −10, [−15.4,−4.9]
I m = 9, [5.3, 14.8] m = 10, [4.6, 15.5]
σ m = 32, [26.6, 36.1] m = 9.1, [8.2, 9.8]
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of expected responses, the estimates for σ are much higher than expected
suggesting that this may be what is explaining the difference between the
two models.
These results, however, are averaged across all of the initial parameter
combinations so to ascertain if these patterns were consistent across each of
these combinations, the original GOF values were compared to the simulated
distributions to ascertain which model is fitting the data best in which sce-
nario. All original ∆GOFAB values were classified against the ∆GOFXA,AB
and ∆GOFXB ,AB distributions that were generated from the 2pB and the
BRM.
The ability to correctly classify the original GOF values as coming from
one of the 2pB or BRM varied depending on how much overlap there was
between the∆GOFXA,AB and∆GOFXB ,AB distributions. Figure 6.26 shows
an example two distributions with overlap but that are clearly distinct. In
this instance the ability to classify data as being generated from one model or
the other is possible for observations in the lower tail of the lower distribution
or the upper tail of the upper distribution. The sort of overlapping-but-
distinct distributions were most common when looking at the ∆GOFXA,AB
when the base data were BRM allowing for a greater ability to classify
observations than when the 2pB were used to simulated the original data.
There were cases when the distributions of ∆GOFXA,AB for the BRM
and 2pB were almost identical. Figure 6.27 displays one such situation
and it is clear, in this Figure, that there is very little difference between the
distributions generated on the BRM data and the 2pB data. It is impossible,
in this situation, to classify as BRM or 2pB and the result for all observations
here would be that we can not determine which model is best. This sort of
overlap occurred most frequently when the base data was simulated using
the 2pB.
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Figure 6.26: Two distributions with some overlap, but generally distinct,
make for the best opportunity to be able to classify as either one or the
other. In this example, smaller values would be classified as coming from a
BRM model while larger values would be classified as 2pB.
Figure 6.27: There is almost complete overlap between the distributions
generated using the BRM 2pB models. In this situation it is impossible to
classify as either model due to the close overlap.
The final situation encountered in classification of the ∆GOFAB was
associated with a ∆GOFXA,AB completely nested within the ∆GOFXB ,AB
distributions. Figure 6.28 gives an example of this where the distribution
generated on the 2pB data is completely nested within the the distribu-
tion generated using the BRM. In this case, the only classifications that
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can occur are when observations fall in the tails of the BRM distribution,
leading to classification as BRM. Otherwise, observations here are unable to
be identified. A result of having one distribution completely nested within
another happened across both sets of base data but it was usually the BRM
distribution that was the widest. This may be why the results which were
averaged across all parameter combinations suggested that the 2pB was pre-
ferred over the BRM in general as the occasional large variability estimates
in GOF for the BRM may skew the results.
Figure 6.28: In the situation pictured here, the distribution generated on the
2pB data is completely nested within the the distribution generated using
the BRM. In this case, the only classifications that can occur are either to
identify as being from the BRM or be unidentifiable.
Although there was occasional nesting of the 2pB distribution inside the
BRM distributions, the original GOF fit values between the 2pB and the
BRM were classified the majority of the time (Table 6.8). In fact, Table 6.8
shows that, when the BRM simulated the base data only ten times was it
unable to classify the original ∆GOFAB and the BRM was chosen as the
preferred model 79% of the time. When the 2pB simulated the base data
there was only a slight preference for the 2pB over the BRM as the simulating
model with 48% classified as coming from the 2pB distribution. However,
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Table 6.8: The confusion matrix for the classification of base data given
the goodness of fit model comparisons. Here the original ∆GOFAB of the
2pB versus BRM, is classified using the related distributions of ∆GOFXA,AB
and ∆GOFXB ,AB for both the base data simulated using the 2pB and the
BRM. When the base data was simulated using the 2pB, there was very
little difference in preference for the 2pB or the BRM as the generating
model. When the base data was simulated using the BRM, there was a
clear preference for the BRM over the 2pB.
Predicted Data
Base Data 2pB (% ) BRM (% ) CND
2pB 333 (48 ) 318 (46 ) 44
BRM 93 (19 ) 397 (79 ) 10
it was the case that 91% (290 cases) of the observations classified as BRM
when the base data was 2pB were from nested distributions such as the one
displayed in Figure 6.28 while only this only occurred 3 times when the 2pB
was preferred. This suggests that it was the large variation in the estimates
associated with the BRM that influenced the incorrect categorisation with
the 2pB data.
It would appear then, that data simulated using the 2pB or the BRM
is best recovered when using the model that created it with some potential
for the BRM to also explain 2pB data.
6.8 Discussion
The aim of this study was to ascertain if parameter estimates of any model
of behaviour on the BART could be gained with enough accuracy to be use-
ful at the level of the individual. This is very different to being able to use
cognitive models of performance to measure differences between groups of
individuals in a research context. Although van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011)
found success using the 2pB model to find differences between groups, the
results of this study would suggest that this model will not always provide
reliable results if used in a clinical context where the goal is to make infer-
ence about possible cognitive deficits. Importantly, it is often individuals
with extreme behaviours that will present for clinical evaluation. For exam-
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ple individuals with deficits in memory processes, impulsive behaviours or
other cognitive deficits resulting in behavioural issues that, in turn, lead to
psychological assessment and intervention. It is therefore imperative that a
cognitive model of performance on a task be accurate at measuring param-
eters which reflect these extreme behaviours.
Section 6.7.1 showed that estimates of α and β in the 2pB model were not
accurately recovered when parameter estimates became more extreme. As
a reminder, in the 2pB, α ∈ (0,m) represents the point at, above which, the
individual believes the balloon is more likely to burst than not and β ∈ (0, 1)
is a measure of the participant’s behavioural consistency with that belief. If
the maximum number of pumps m on any given trial is m = 130, then it
would not be unreasonable to think a participant may have an α estimate of
40, 50 or 60. Yet if we couple an estimate of α in this range with a high level
of behavioural consistency (for example β ≥ 0.6 it becomes increasingly
difficult to recover β accurately with estimates 0.2 or greater different to
the value used to simulate the data. A difference of 0.2 in an estimate of
behavioural consistency is a large difference when β ∈ (0, 1) and could lead
to a clinical interpretation of these estimates that is not a true reflection of
the individual’s behaviour.
Similarly, when behavioural consistency was very low, Section 6.7.1 showed
that it became difficult to recover α within a reasonable level of accuracy
with estimates 20 points different to those used to simulate the data. Again,
the interpretation of these estimates for an individual in a clinical setting
may not reflect the individual’s true cognitive process. In both the case
of α and β, individuals with extreme estimates are not guaranteed to be
recovered with a reasonable level of accuracy.
Using a simple empirical model, the BRM, to explain the data was most
effective in parameter recover simulations. With parameter D empirically
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modelling the decrease in number of pumps guessed following a burst and I
the size of the increase following a successful cash-in, both parameters were
recovered within ±5 units in the majority of cases. The clear exception
to this was when the standard deviation of the simulation was low and
simulated values of D or I were = 0. In those situations, estimates were
out by as much as 10 units difference for some specific combinations of
parameters where either D = 0, or I = 0 and the corresponding I or D
values were large.
When the σ parameter is low, an individual’s pump guesses are highly
consistent with what is predicted by the model, leading to guesses with a
very small range. This can be a problem when one parameter is set to
zero and the other is allowed to take large steps as the individual is more
likely to converge to the maximal or minimal pump guesses allowed by the
task (minimum of 1 pump or maximum of 130 pumps). For example, a
data set generated with D = 0, I = 20 and σ = 1 will decrease their
pump guess on trial k+ 1 by Changek+1 ∼ N (0, 1) if trial k was a burst or
alternately, if trial k was successfully cashed in, increase their pump guess by
Changek+1 ∼ N (20, 1). Continuing this behaviour will potentially end up
with guesses being capped at the maximal value of 130 making it harder for
the model to estimate the true value of I. However, in those circumstances,
the zero estimate (whether it be for D = 0 or I = 0) was well recovered
allowing for some level of interpretation of cognitive deficits in the decision
making process. Given the parameters of the BRM have been theorised to
be linked to an individual’s impulsivity following a loss (D) and confidence
following a win (I), in the situation where D = 0 this would indicate an
impulsive individual who is discounting losses, while an estimate of I = 0
would suggest the individual is discounting wins. As such, these estimates
may still be of use in a clinical context suggesting that the BRM may be a
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viable alternative to the 2pB for use at the level of the individual.
The RDRM was considered as an attempt to model trial dependency
above what is modelled in the BRM by including information about how
many successful trials (the run length) an individual has seen in a row. The
inclusion of the φ parameter enabled the effect of the length of the run to
have increasing, stable or decreasing effects on the magnitude of a pump
guess following a win. However, the inclusion of the φ parameter resulted
in some situations where the estimates of φ and I could not be uniquely
identified. Similarly to the least accurate estimates using the BRM, φ was
most difficult to recover when I = 0 with estimates occasionally substituting
an I = 0 estimate with a large, negative estimate of φ. Despite this, the
psychological interpretation of these estimates are arguably similar with
both suggesting the individual is ignoring win information.
In Section 6.7.2 the BRM showed that it was more able to adapt to differ-
ent styles of data than the 2pB. Although both models were best identified
when they also simulated the data they were being fit to, the BRM was
preferred when the original data was simulated using the BRM but there
was no clear preference between the 2pB and the BRM when the original
data was created using the 2pB. This finding was, however, tempered by the
kinds of estimates gained through the parameter recovery simulations: 2pB
estimates of BRM data suggested flat probability profiles with correspond-
ing random participant choices, where as BRM fits to 2pB data tended to
explain the variability in estimates through expansion of the σ parameter
(a measure of variance). Neither of these situations are particularly insight-
ful clinically. The next question is then, how do real people behave? Is
behaviour too complex for the simplicity of the BRM to model effectively?
Ideally, the next step in analysis should be to fit the BRM to some real
data. The σ parameter can be estimated alongside D and I as a measure
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of behavioural consistency and it can be investigated what range of values
σ may be expected to take.
It would also be interesting to examine whether any of these models per-
form better if the task itself were more realistic. Balloons are familiar to
many individuals and it is arguable that they do not burst in a uniformly
distributed pattern. If the task itself were to be designed to have an optimal
burst point with normally distributed errors, this would increase the com-
plexity of the task but it would make it more realistic. The question then
would be whether, like with the Iowa Gambling Task in Chapter 4, the task
has become too complex to tease apart memory from impulsivity, however
it would be worth exploring.
One of the main aims of the BRM model was to find an empirical way
of modelling BART data and, even a small extension into a mix between
mechanistic and empirical models withe RDRM seemed to make parameter
recovery more complex. The maximum likelihood analysis reported here was
chosen to facilitate this empirical style but it may be the case that moving
to Bayesian analyses would provide stronger results. Of course, there are
other frequentist styles of analyses that could be pursued also and, like
the suggestion in Chapter 2, exploring a generalised additive model (GAM)
to help define patterns in the estimates of σ (if they exist) for the BRM
may provide the extra insight that will help extend this model. Using a
GAM is a unique, empirical style of analysis which allows the definition of
patterns or trends in the data based on the data itself. Either way, several
questions remain unanswered that must be addressed before either the BRM
or the RDRM can be proposed for clinical use. Firstly, a range of realistic
values for σ needs to be ascertained such that the distribution assumptions
of the models can be tailored to maximise the accuracy of results. Second,
ascertaining whether the BRM or RDRM gains the most consistent and well
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localised estimates when applied to real world data needs to be investigated.
And, finally, a study of the validity of the measures needs to be conducted.
Links between D, I and σ and the proposed cognitive processes which they
represent (namely impulsivity or risk aversion, confidence and behavioural
consistency) need to be established.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The first part of this thesis was concerned with estimating the extent of illicit
drug use in the community. Chapter 2 presented a published paper based on
empirical, time series analysis of longitudinal illicit drug use data, obtained
from wastewater analysis of a large catchment for four different drugs. We
found that understanding weekly cycles in drug use can help inform the
design of wastewater sampling schemes to maximise the ability to reliably
interpret temporal trends while minimising the cost of data collection. For
the first time, the analysis in Chapter 2 provides researchers with a com-
prehensive assessment of monitoring schemes for drugs with different usage
patterns, helping researchers in the field to design long term monitoring of
drug use in different sewage catchments in a cost-effective way.
Extending the sampling strategies suggested in Chapter 2 to new regions
outside of the Gold Coast, Queensland, would be a logical next step for anal-
ysis. However, a more subtle extension on this topic is related to the kinds
of information that can be obtained from the analysis itself. Time series
provides a measure of the overall trend in the data and, while in Chapter 2
summaries of least squares results were constructed to provide measures of
the differences between the sampling strategies tested, there was no concrete
way of summarising the statistical significance of overall trends in drug use
for each of the four drugs. In that way, time series provides a descriptive
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summary of overall trend rather than an inferential one. The use of Gen-
eralised Additive Models (GAMs) in the place of time series analysis would
allow for a summary of the overall trends in the data that can be used in
a more inferential way (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990). Highly adaptable,
GAMs are only recently being discovered across the psychological sciences
with a search for Generalized additive model in the PsychINFO data base
returning only 28 scholarly journal results, 15 of which have been published
since 2014. In the area of wastewater-based epidemiology, it appears that
GAMs have not yet been investigated as a way of quantifying the trends
in data. If future work could look at implementing both an effective sam-
pling scheme and a more inferential form of analysis, then the information
obtained from wastewater sampling may become even more useful for the
field.
Moving to measuring the cognitive impact of illicit drug use on the in-
dividual, Chapters 4 - 6 used both empirical and mechanistic models to
decompose behaviour on two popular psychological assessment tools which
produce temporally autocorrelated data.
Chapter 4 presented a published paper addressing whether a mechanis-
tic model of cognitive performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), the
Expectancy Valence Model (EVM), is suitable for use at decomposing be-
haviour at the level of the individual. Parameter estimates of the EVM,
when applied to IGT data, were revealed to be non-normal and unreason-
ably localised with observed estimates showing bi-modality, non-linearity or
spanning the entire parameter space, even when an individual completed the
IGT multiple times. As such, Chapter 4 found the EVM to be unsuitable
for use in clinical practice where the goal is to base treatment decisions for
an individual on the outcomes of their performance on the IGT. However, a
new, simplified, two-parameter version of the EVM was suggested as a pos-
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sible alternative to the EVM. The two-parameter EVM had clearer, more
easily interpretable results when applied to IGT data suggesting it may be
more viable for use in a clinical setting.
Chapter 4 also highlighted potential problems with the IGT itself. The
seeming lack of test-retest reliability observed in experiment two and the lack
of a clear relationship between frequency of deck choice and net return across
all experiments were two of the most obvious indicators that the IGT may
be a more complex task than it was designed to be. Despite this, the IGT
is still in frequent use and many new cognitive models of performance are
being proposed in the place of the EVM to tease apart the cognitive processes
which give rise to behaviour on the IGT. These include the Prospect Valence
Model (PVM) proposed by Ahn et al. (2008) and several variations of it. In
future it would be interesting to see if the problems observed with recovering
estimates at the level of the individual on the EVM are also obvious for
the PVM and its related models. If the problems of non-normality and
unreasonably localised estimates are prevalent across many models, it may
be an indicator that the IGT itself need to be improved or simplified.
Chapter 6 continues the theme of simplification by using a simplified cog-
nitive assessment tool, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) which relies
on a less complex system of cognitive processes to produce behaviour than
the IGT. Using simulation studies, Chapter 6 revealed that the variability
associated with parameter estimates using the leading mechanistic model of
cognitive performance on the BART, the van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) two-
parameter BART model, led to a lack of accuracy in estimates of individual
behaviour. As such, the van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2011) two-parameter BART
model, may not always provide reliable results if used in a clinical context.
The key phrase here being in a clinical context. The focus on parameter
recovery for individuals who may behave more extremely than those who
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are considered to be behaving within a normal range is important clinically
as it often those with cognitive deficits who behave extremely which present
for treatment. Accurately measuring those cognitive deficits are therefore
extremely important if a model is to be used in a clinical context. Analysis
of the two-parameter BART model revealed that, as the parameter values
used for generating the data became more extreme, the accuracy of their
recovery decreased. However two, new, empirically derived models of per-
formance on the BART, the Basic Response Model (BRM) and the Run
Dependent Response Model (RDRM), were able to recover parameter val-
ues with little variability under most conditions except for some extreme
parameter values. Investigation is required to ascertain if those parameter
values are likely to be observed in a clinical context.
The BMR had the least variable parameter recovery, especially when
the standard deviation during simulation was not restricted too extremely.
But, even in the case of a narrow standard deviation, the results gained
still had an accurately interpretable outcome. The RDRM was less accu-
rate at recovering parameters than the BRM but, in specific cases where
identifiability of parameters became an issue, the physical interpretation of
the results was consistent. These results suggest that both the BRM and
RDRM may be possible alternatives for use in a clinical context over the
two-parameter BART model. However, as both the BRM and RDRM are
empirical models, and therefore were not constructed through considera-
tion of the theories of the underling cognitive processes which gave rise to
the observed data, Chapter 6 highlights the need for validity studies and
application of the BRM and RDRM to real data as future endeavours.
In the introduction to this thesis, a discussion between Ferguson (2015)
and Tryon (2016) raised a question about the future of psychological science;
whether more mechanistic or more empirical models should be used. This
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thesis has presented a situation in which empirical analysis has answered
all of the questions asked in Chapter 2 (measuring the extent of illicit drug
use in the community) and a situation in which a mechanistic model was
proposed as a viable option in Chapter 4 (using the two-parameter EVM
to gain more accurate estimates of performance on the IGT at the level of
the individual). It is clear that there are some situations in which empirical
analyses are required and provide the best answers to the research questions
being asked but it is also clear that, to understand the cognitive mechanisms
which give rise to observed behaviour, mechanistic models have a power that
empirical analyses do not. But Chapter 6 presents an example in which a
mechanistic model may not be able to be used with a good level of accuracy
in a clinical context and two empirical alternatives that appear to be more
accurate but which only have suggested links to the cognitive aspects of
performance they might represent. So it would appear that the answer to
the ‘mechanistic or empirical’ question is not straight forward.
Mechanistic models come from a perspective of hard theory, there are
reasoned arguments behind the components included in the model, and these
arguments and theories require testing and revision if they are found to be
incorrect. The empirical, data driven models work by providing a solution
to explaining observed data but with the added complexity of then having to
determine what the results mean for the proposed theories. Ferguson (2015)
argued for a need for flexibility in psychological sciences, with less reliance on
existing, mechanistic models, to find evidence and Tryon (2016) responded
with seemingly contrary suggestion that there is a need for more mechanistic
models to compete with those existing in the psychological literature. But
really mechanistic and empirical models are just direct or indirect ways
of approaching the same question. As an example, the BRM and RDRM
seem to answer both of these arguments. Although empirically derived,
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hence answering Ferguson’s request for less reliance on existing mechanistic
models, the BRM and RDRM do appear to have the potential to be linked to
the cognitive processes underlying behaviour. If those links can be validated
then, satisfying Tryon’s call for more mechanistic models, the BRM and/or
RDRM may become new mechanistic models of cognitive performance on
the BART.
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